Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 1,070

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long‐Term Perspective

Huson, Mark R., Parrino, Robert, Starks, Laura T.·2001·The Journal of Finance
DOI 10.1111/0022-1082.00405
Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

We report evidence on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover during the 1971 to 1994 period. We find that the nature of CEO turnover activity has changed over time. The frequencies of forced CEO turnover and outside succession both increased. However, the relation between the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and firm performance did not change significantly from the beginning to the end of the period we examine, despite substantial changes in internal governance mechanisms. The evidence also indicates that changes in the intensity of the takeover market are not associated with changes in the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/0022-1082.00405

Cites

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cited by

See all 1,070

Metadata

Authors
Huson, M. R., Parrino, R., & Starks, L. T.
Venue
The Journal of Finance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2001-12
Volume
56
Issue
6
Pages
2265-2297
ISSN
  • 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-6261
DOI
10.1111/0022-1082.00405
OpenAlex
W2106441135
Cited by
1,070
References
0
FWCI
88.89
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long‐Term Perspective. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/0022-1082.00405
The paper
Huson, M. R., Parrino, R., & Starks, L. T. (2001). Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long‐Term Perspective. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00405

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.