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Rational Ignorance versus Rational Irrationality

Caplan, Bryan · 2001 · Kyklos
Cited by 207

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

The paper presents a model of ‘rational irrationality’ to explain why political and religious beliefs are marked not only by low information (as the notion of rational ignorance highlights), but also by systematic bias and high certainty. Being irrational – i.e., deviating from rational expectations – is modeled as normal good. The reason that irrationality in politics and religion is so pronounced is that the private repercussions of error are virtually nonexistant. The consumption of irrationality can be efficient, but it will usually not be when the private and the social cost of irrationality differ – for example, in elections.

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Crossref · 10.1111/1467-6435.00138

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Metadata

Authors
Caplan, B.
Venue
Kyklos
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2001-02
Volume
54
Issue
1
Pages
3-26
ISSN
  • 0023-5962 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-6435
OpenAlex
W2133117817
Cited by
207
References
1
FWCI
4.43
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Rational Ignorance versus Rational Irrationality. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/1467-6435.00138
The paper
Caplan, B. (2001). Rational Ignorance versus Rational Irrationality. Kyklos. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6435.00138

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.