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A Non‐Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism
Abstract
The concept of legal pluralism has been touted by many socio‐legal scholars as a key concept in the analysis of law. Yet, after almost twenty years of such claims, there has been little progress in the development of the concept. This article will argue that the underlying cause of this lack progress lies in the fact that promoters of the concept have relied upon function‐based, essentialist concepts of law. It will describe the problems generated by such concepts and, following this general analysis, will review the versions of legal pluralism articulated by Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Gunther Teubner. The critique of their versions of legal pluralism will lead into the posing of a non‐essentialist alternative which avoids the conceptual problems of prevailing versions of legal pluralism, and provides a better tool for purposes of research and analysis of the relationship between law and society.
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Cited by
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Levinson, B. A. U., Sutton, M., & Winstead, T. (2009) · Educational Policy · doi:10.1177/0895904808320676 · Cited by 450
Michaels, R. (2009) · Annual Review of Law and Social Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.4.110707.172311 · Cited by 363
Critical Reflections on Regulation
Black, J. (2017) · Crime and Regulation · doi:10.4324/9781351126816-2 · Cited by 343
Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization, and Emancipation
de Sousa Santos, B. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316662427 · Cited by 329
Halliday, T. C., & Shaffer, G. (2015) · Transnational Legal Orders · doi:10.1017/cbo9781107707092.002 · Cited by 255
The concept of living customary law: a critique
Diala, A. C. (2017) · The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law · doi:10.1080/07329113.2017.1331301 · Cited by 73
Metadata
- Authors
- Tamanha, B. Z.
- Venue
- Journal of Law and Society
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2000-06
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 296-321
- ISSN
- 0263-323X (ISSN-L)
- 1467-6478
- OpenAlex
- W2064228999
- Cited by
- 299
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 32.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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