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A New Institutional Approach to Innovation Policy

Davidson, Sinclair, Potts, Jason·2016·Australian Economic Review

Abstract

Modern research and innovation policy is largely based on neoclassical welfare economics, in which the diagnosis of market failure in the production of new information is translated into a case for innovation policy. Both New Institutional and Public Choice economics criticise this approach because it tends to assume that policy interventions are largely costless and produce only benefits. An alternative policy model is proposed that focuses on minimising the social costs of innovation policy through efficient choice of institutions. We review the recently released National Innovation and Science Agenda through this lens.

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Research works printed but not linked: 40

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Metadata

Authors
Davidson, S., & Potts, J.
Venue
Australian Economic Review
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2016-02
Volume
49
Issue
2
Pages
200-207
ISSN
0004-9018
Cited by
27
References
1
Language
en

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