The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Motivated Scientific Reasoning Biases, Epistemological Beliefs, and Theory Polarization: A Two-Process Approach to Adolescent Cognition
Abstract
Theory-motivated reasoning biases arise when different reasoning skills are invoked to evaluate evidence that is congruent or incongruent with individuals' belief systems. To explore this phenomenon, 66 early and 73 middle adolescents evaluated evidence relevant to their theories of social class or religion. In both conditions, reasoning biases were found, but in-group biases were evident only in the religion condition. In both conditions, higher order scientific reasoning was used to reject theory-incongruent evidence and judgmental heuristics (i.e., cognitive rules of thumb) were used to evaluate theory-congruent evidence. In both conditions, subsequent to the evidence presentation, adolescents' theories became more extreme (i.e., polarized) than at the outset of the experiment. Beliefs regarding the origin, acquisition, and certainty of knowledge, however, appeared to moderate reasoning biases and theory polarization. Age differences emerged on only one index of bias: In the religion condition, middle adolescents were more likely to treat theory-incongruent evidence as implausible. These findings are pertinent to theories of cognitive development, decision making, rationality, and in-group favoritism.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The case for motivated reasoning.
Kunda, Z. (1990) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480 · Cited by 9,022
Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.42.1.116 · Cited by 5,359
Cited by
Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2008) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629 · Cited by 5,137
In two minds: dual-process accounts of reasoning
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2003) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2003.08.012 · Cited by 1,569
The development of scientific thinking skills in elementary and middle school
Zimmerman, C. (2007) · Developmental Review · doi:10.1016/j.dr.2006.12.001 · Cited by 671
Haidt, J., & Joseph, C. (2008) · The Innate Mind, Volume 3 · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195332834.003.0019 · Cited by 650
The Development of Argument Skills
Kuhn, D., & Udell, W. (2003) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00605 · Cited by 595
Metadata
- Authors
- Klaczynski, P. A.
- Venue
- Child Development
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2000-09-01
- Volume
- 71
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1347-1366
- ISSN
- 0009-3920 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8624
- OpenAlex
- W2088397639
- Cited by
- 212
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 11.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Motivated Scientific Reasoning Biases, Epistemological Beliefs, and Theory Polarization: A Two-Process Approach to Adolescent Cognition. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/1467-8624.00232
- The paper
- Klaczynski, P. A. (2000). Motivated Scientific Reasoning Biases, Epistemological Beliefs, and Theory Polarization: A Two-Process Approach to Adolescent Cognition. Child Development. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00232
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.