In-between Believing
Abstract
For any proposition p, it may sometimes occur that a person is not quite accurately describable as believing that p, nor quite accurately describable as failing to believe that p. I describe such a person as in an ‘in‐between state of belief’. I argue for the prevalence of in‐between states of believing, and assert the need for an account of belief that allows us intelligibly to talk about in‐between believing. I suggest that Bayesian and representationalist approaches are inadequate to the task, and that a Rylean dispositional account of belief might do the trick.
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In-between beliefs about AI consciousness may be regarded as borderline cases of epistemic irrationality, straddling the line between the benign and the irrational.
“in-between beliefs about AI consciousness may be regarded as borderline cases of epistemic irrationality, straddling the line between the benign and the irrational.”
From Are Attributions of Consciousness to AI Chatbots Epistemically Innocent? (2026) · cites this paper as Schwitzgebel, 2001
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Are Attributions of Consciousness to AI Chatbots Epistemically Innocent?
Peters, U. (2026) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-026-09795-8
- Authors
- Schwitzgebel, E.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Riverside (US)
- Corresponding author
- Schwitzgebel, Eric
- ORCID
- Schwitzgebel, Eric
- Venue
- The Philosophical Quarterly
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2001-01
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 202
- Pages
- 76-82
- ISSN
- 0031-8094 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9213
- OpenAlex
- W2076441990
- Cited by
- 183
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 34 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 9 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 9 · 2013: 10 · 2012: 7
- FWCI
- 2.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Philosophical Quarterly (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
- Keywords
- belief, epistemic states, Ryle, representationalism
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