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Cited by 614

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Future Contingents and Relative Truth

MacFarlane, John·2003·The Philosophical Quarterly

Abstract

If it is not now determined whether there will be a sea battle tomorrow, can an assertion that there will be one be true? The problem has persisted because there are compelling arguments on both sides. If there are objectively possible futures which would make the prediction true and others which would make it false, symmetry considerations seem to forbid counting it either true or false. Yet if we think about how we would assess the prediction tomorrow, when a sea battle is raging (or not), it seems we must assign the utterance a definite truth‐value. I argue that both arguments must be given their due, and that this requires relativizing utterance‐truth to a context of assessment. I show how this relativization can be handled in a rigorous formal semantics, and I argue that we can make coherent sense of assertion without assuming that utterances have their truth‐values absolutely.

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Metadata

Authors
MacFarlane, J.
Venue
The Philosophical Quarterly
Published
2003-07
Volume
53
Issue
212
Pages
321-336
ISSN
  • 0031-8094 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-9213
OpenAlex
W2114999042
Cited by
614
References
6
FWCI
36.80
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Future Contingents and Relative Truth. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/1467-9213.00315
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MacFarlane, J. (2003). Future Contingents and Relative Truth. The Philosophical Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00315

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.