The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Future Contingents and Relative Truth
Abstract
If it is not now determined whether there will be a sea battle tomorrow, can an assertion that there will be one be true? The problem has persisted because there are compelling arguments on both sides. If there are objectively possible futures which would make the prediction true and others which would make it false, symmetry considerations seem to forbid counting it either true or false. Yet if we think about how we would assess the prediction tomorrow, when a sea battle is raging (or not), it seems we must assign the utterance a definite truth‐value. I argue that both arguments must be given their due, and that this requires relativizing utterance‐truth to a context of assessment. I show how this relativization can be handled in a rigorous formal semantics, and I argue that we can make coherent sense of assertion without assuming that utterances have their truth‐values absolutely.
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Cites
Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts
Searle, J. R. (1979) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609213 · Cited by 3,502
Lewis, D. (1980) · Philosophy and Grammar · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-9012-8_6 · Cited by 621
Indeterminist time and truth‐value gaps1
THOMASON, R. H. (1970) · Theoria · doi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.1970.tb00427.x · Cited by 423
Belnap, N. (1992) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/bf00414289 · Cited by 207
(1997) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198239208.001.0001 · Cited by 117
(1986)
Cited by
Context Dependence, Disagreement, and Predicates of Personal Taste*
Lasersohn, P. (2005) · Linguistics and Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10988-005-0596-x · Cited by 945
MacFarlane, J. (2007) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-006-9049-9 · Cited by 372
Self-citationXIV*-MAKING SENSE OF RELATIVE TRUTH
MacFarlane, J. (2005) · Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2005.00178.x · Cited by 267
Self-citationPerspectival Thought: A Plea for (Moderate) Relativism
Recanati, F. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.001.0001 · Cited by 257
From Utterances to Speech Acts
Kissine, M. (2013) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511842191 · Cited by 255
Metadata
- Authors
- MacFarlane, J.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Quarterly
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2003-07
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 212
- Pages
- 321-336
- ISSN
- 0031-8094 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9213
- OpenAlex
- W2114999042
- Cited by
- 614
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 36.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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