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Strategic Trading and Welfare in a Dynamic Market
Open accessAbstract
This paper studies a dynamic model of a financial market with N strategic agents. Agents receive random stock endowments at each period and trade to share dividend risk. Endowments are the only private information in the model. We find that agents trade slowly even when the time between trades goes to 0. In fact, welfare loss due to strategic behaviour increases as the time between trades decreases. In the limit when the time between trades goes to 0, welfare loss is of order 1/N, and not 1/N2 as in the static models of the double auctions literature. The model is very tractable and closed-form solutions are obtained in a special case.
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Citations
Cited by
The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response *
Budish, E., Cramton, P., & Shim, J. (2015) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjv027 · Cited by 883
Biais, B., Foucault, T., & Moinas, S. (2015) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.03.004 · Cited by 529
Market microstructure: A survey of microfoundations, empirical results, and policy implications
Biais, B., Glosten, L., & Spatt, C. (2005) · Journal of Financial Markets · doi:10.1016/j.finmar.2004.11.001 · Cited by 471
Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?
Ellison, G., & Fudenberg, D. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355303322552793 · Cited by 156
Kogan, L., Ross, S. A., Wang, J., & Westerfield, M. M. (2017) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2016.12.002 · Cited by 38
Metadata
- Authors
- Vayanos, D.
- Venue
- Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1999-04
- Volume
- 66
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 219-254
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W2012231538
- Cited by
- 237
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 7.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Vayanos, D. (1999). Strategic Trading and Welfare in a Dynamic Market. Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00086
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.