The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
Abstract
We consider the dynamic private provision of funds to projects that generate public benefits. Participants have complete information about the environment, but imperfect information about individual actions: each period they observe only the aggregate contribution. Each player may contribute any amount in any period before the contributing horizon is reached. All Nash equilibrium outcomes are characterized. In many cases they are all also perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes. If the horizon is long, if the players' preferences are similar, and if they are patient or the period length is short, perfect Bayesian equilibria exist that essentially complete the project. In some of them the completion time shrinks to zero with the period length—efficiency is achieved in the limit.
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Cites
The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods
Cornes, R., & Sandler, T. (1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174312 · Cited by 2,637
On the private provision of public goods
Bergstrom, T., Blume, L., & Varian, H. (1986) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(86)90024-1 · Cited by 2,267
2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research
Ledyard, J. O. (1995) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics · doi:10.1515/9780691213255-004 · Cited by 1,033
Privately provided public goods in a large economy: The limits of altruism
Andreoni, J. (1988) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(88)90061-8 · Cited by 857
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1991) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(91)90155-w · Cited by 646
Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
Bagnoli, M., & Lipman, B. L. (1989) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297502 · Cited by 518
Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysis
Palfrey, T. R., & Rosenthal, H. (1984) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(84)90023-9 · Cited by 474
Dragon-slaying and ballroom dancing: The private supply of a public good
Bliss, C., & Nalebuff, B. (1984) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(84)90041-0 · Cited by 303
The theory of externalities, public goods and club goods. 2nd. ed.
Cornes, R., & Sandler, T. M. (1996) · Cited by 291
Joint Projects without Commitment
Admati, A. R., & Perry, M. (1991) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297967 · Cited by 286
Cited by
Brunia, C. H. M., & van Boxtel, G. J. M. (2001) · International Journal of Psychophysiology · doi:10.1016/s0167-8760(01)00179-9 · Cited by 721
Selling to Socially Responsible Consumers: Competition and The Private Provision of Public Goods
Bagnoli, M., & Watts, S. G. (2003) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00419.x · Cited by 583
Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
Keller, G., Rady, S., & Cripps, M. (2005) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00564.x · Cited by 463
Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information
Menezes, F. M., Monteiro, P. K., & Temimi, A. (2001) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-4068(01)00059-3 · Cited by 76
Metadata
- Authors
- Max, L. M., & Matthews, S.
- Venue
- Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2000-04
- Volume
- 67
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 327-358
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W2104324367
- Cited by
- 279
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 12.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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