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Cited by 279

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project

Max, Leslie M., Matthews, Steven·2000·Review of Economic Studies

Abstract

We consider the dynamic private provision of funds to projects that generate public benefits. Participants have complete information about the environment, but imperfect information about individual actions: each period they observe only the aggregate contribution. Each player may contribute any amount in any period before the contributing horizon is reached. All Nash equilibrium outcomes are characterized. In many cases they are all also perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes. If the horizon is long, if the players' preferences are similar, and if they are patient or the period length is short, perfect Bayesian equilibria exist that essentially complete the project. In some of them the completion time shrinks to zero with the period length—efficiency is achieved in the limit.

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Metadata

Authors
Max, L. M., & Matthews, S.
Venue
Review of Economic Studies
Published
2000-04
Volume
67
Issue
2
Pages
327-358
ISSN
  • 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-937X
OpenAlex
W2104324367
Cited by
279
References
16
FWCI
12.88
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/1467-937x.00134
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Max, L. M., & Matthews, S. (2000). Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project. Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00134

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