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Professionals Play Minimax
Abstract
The implications of the Minimax theorem are tested using natural data. The tests use a unique data set from penalty kicks in professional soccer games. In this natural setting experts play a one-shot two-person zero-sum game. The results of the tests are remarkably consistent with equilibrium play in every respect: (i) winning probabilities are statistically identical across strategies for players; (ii) players' choices are serially independent. The tests have substantial power to distinguish equilibrium play from disequilibrium alternatives. These results represent the first time that both implications of von Neumann's Minimax theorem are supported under natural conditions.
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Citations
Cited by
Chiappori, P.-A., Levitt, S., & Groseclose, T. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/00028280260344678 · Cited by 414
Walker, M., & Wooders, J. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.5.1521 · Cited by 383
Psychological Pressure in Competitive Environments: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment
Apesteguia, J., & Palacios-Huerta, I. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.5.2548 · Cited by 305
Self-citationWhat's next? Judging sequences of binary events.
Oskarsson, A. T., Van Boven, L., McClelland, G. H., & Hastie, R. (2009) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0014821 · Cited by 253
Reinforcement learning and decision making in monkeys during a competitive game
Lee, D., Conroy, M. L., McGreevy, B. P., & Barraclough, D. J. (2004) · Cognitive Brain Research · doi:10.1016/j.cogbrainres.2004.07.007 · Cited by 156
Metadata
- Authors
- Palacios-Huerta, I.
- Venue
- Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2003-04
- Volume
- 70
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 395-415
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W1501399288
- Cited by
- 326
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 6.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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