The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Learning How
Open accessAbstract
In this paper, I consider intellectualist and anti-intellectualist approaches to knowledge-how and propose a third solution: a virtue-based account of knowledge-how. I sketch the advantages of a virtue-based account of knowledge-how and consider whether we should prefer a reliabilist or a responsibilist virtue-account of knowledge-how. I argue that only a responsibilist account will maintain the crucial distinction between knowing how to do something and merely being able to do it. Such an account, I hold, must incorporate ‘learning how to do something’ as an essential part. Drawing on an argument by Craig, I hold that the function of the concept of knowing how is to mark out practical experts whom one can trust either to (1) perform an action on one's behalf, or (2) to teach one how to perform that action oneself. The best way to identify practical experts, I hold, is to discover what they have learned about performing the action in question. In arguing for the importance of the concept ‘learning’ to the field of knowledge-how, I argue for a new connection between the philosophy of education and virtue epistemology.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The CT approach has available a good set of tests for assessing the effectiveness of teaching good thinking.
“The fourth advantage of the CT approach to teaching good thinking that we would like to outline is that it has available a good set of tests that accomplishes this.”
From Educating for Intellectual Virtue: A Critique from Action Guidance (2021) · cites this paper as Kotzee 2016
The Introduction discusses teaching disciplinary skills, and the Conclusion presents a virtue-based account of knowing how. Neither passage addresses the CT approach or a set of tests for assessing whether teaching improves thinking. Searches for critical-thinking tests and assessment of teaching good thinking found no passage addressing the claim. (LLM, conf=0.76)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredEmpirical assessment of virtue development in students is decades behind the methods we already possess for assessing critical thinking ability.
“and empirical assessment of virtue development in students is decades behind the methods we already possess for assessing critical thinking ability.”
From Educating for Intellectual Virtue: A Critique from Action Guidance (2021) · cites this paper as Kotzee 2016
The section 'Towards a virtue account of knowledge-how' describes intellectual virtues as learned traits, and the Conclusion develops a philosophical account of learning how; neither discusses empirical assessment of students. Searches for virtue-development measures, critical-thinking assessment, and the claimed decades-long gap found no passage addressing that comparison. Page numbers were not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.76)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe assessment of critical thinking is much more advanced than the assessment of intellectual virtue.
“As one of us (Kotzee 2016) has outlined, the assessment of critical thinking is much more advanced than the assessment of intellectual virtue”
From Educating for Intellectual Virtue: A Critique from Action Guidance (2021) · cites this paper as Kotzee 2016
The section ‘Towards a virtue account of knowledge-how’ discusses intellectual virtues, including being critically minded, but does not compare how critical thinking and intellectual virtue are assessed. Searches for the claimed comparison and for assessment terminology found no passage addressing it; the Conclusion instead summarizes an account of knowledge-how. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.76)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Pritchard, D. (2005) · doi:10.1093/019928038x.001.0001 · Cited by 874
Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 33
- Annas, 2011, Intelligent Virtue, 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228782.001.0001 · DOI · Paper page
- Bengson, 2011, Knowing How
- Carr, 1979, The Logic of Knowing How and Ability, Mind, 88, 394, 10.1093/mind/LXXXVIII.1.394 · DOI
- Carr, 1981, Knowledge in Practice, American Philosophical Quarterly, 18.1, 53
- Carter, 2014, Knowledge-How and Cognitive Achievement, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88.1, 181
- Carter, 2015, Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 49.3, 1
- Craig, 1990, Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis
- Dancy, 1985, An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology
- Dreyfus, 1986, Mind Over Machine
- Dreyfus, 2007, The Return of the Myth of the Mental, Inquiry, 50.4, 352, 10.1080/00201740701489245 · DOI
- Fantl, 2008, Knowing How and Knowing That, Philosophy Compass, 3.3, 451, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00137.x · DOI
- Gettier, 1963, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge, Analysis, 23.6, 121, 10.1093/analys/23.6.121 · DOI
- Greco, 2000, Putting Skeptics in Their Place: the Nature of Sceptical Arguments and their Role in Philosophical Inquiry, 10.1017/CBO9780511527418 · DOI
- Greco, 2010, Achieving Knowledge, 10.1017/CBO9780511844645 · DOI
- Hawley, 2010, Testimony and Knowing How, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 41, 397, 10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.10.005 · DOI
- Koethe, 2002, Stanley and Williamson on Knowing How, Journal of Philosophy, 99.6, 325, 10.2307/3655587 · DOI
- Kotzee, 2011, Education and Thick Epistemology, Educational Theory, 61.5, 549, 10.1111/j.1741-5446.2011.00420.x · DOI
- Kotzee, 2013, Introduction: Education, Social Epistemology and Virtue Epistemology, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 47.2, 157, 10.1111/1467-9752.12033 · DOI
- MacAllister, 2012, Virtue Epistemology and the Philosophy of Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 46.2, 251, 10.1111/j.1467-9752.2012.00851.x · DOI
- Montmarquet, 1993, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility
- Polanyi, 1966, The Tacit Dimension
- Rumfitt, 2003, Savoir Faire, Journal of Philosophy, 100.3, 158, 10.5840/jphil2003100319 · DOI
- Ryle, 1949, The Concept of Mind
- Ryle, 1945, Knowing How and Knowing That, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 46, 1, 10.1093/aristotelian/46.1.1 · DOI
- Schön, 1983, The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action
- Sosa, 1980, The Raft and the Pyramid, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5.1, 3, 10.1111/j.1475-4975.1980.tb00394.x · DOI
- Sosa, 1991, Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology, 10.1017/CBO9780511625299 · DOI
- Snowdon, 2004, Knowing How and Knowing That: a Distinction Reconsidered, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 104.1, 1, 10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00079.x · DOI
- Stanley, 2011, Know How, 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695362.001.0001 · DOI
- Stanley, 2013, Motor Skill Depends on Knowledge of Facts, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7.503, 1
- Stanley, 2001, Knowing How, Journal of Philosophy, 98.8, 411, 10.2307/2678403 · DOI
- Winch, 2009, Ryle on Knowing How and the Possibility of Vocational Education, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 26.1, 88, 10.1111/j.1468-5930.2009.00425.x · DOI
- Zagzebski, 1996, Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge, 10.1017/CBO9781139174763 · DOI
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Educating for Intellectual Virtue: A Critique from Action Guidance
Kotzee, B., Carter, J. A., & Siegel, H. (2021) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2019.10 · Cited by 37
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- KOTZEE, B.
- Affiliations
- University of Birmingham (GB)
- Corresponding author
- KOTZEE, BEN
- ORCID
- KOTZEE, BEN
- Venue
- Journal of Philosophy of Education
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2016-05
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 218-232
- ISSN
- 0309-8249 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2437337080
- Cited by
- 11
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2023: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 3
- FWCI
- 18.64
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Journal of Philosophy of Education (publishedVersion)
- University of Birmingham Research Portal (University of Birmingham) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Education, Philosophy, and Society
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- know-how, virtue epistemology, reliabilism, responsibilism, intellectualism, anti-intellectualism, philosophy of education
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
