The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Representing Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space
Abstract
Ž. We extend Kreps’ 1979 analysis of preference for flexibility, reinterpreted by Kreps Ž. 1992 as a model of unforeseen contingencies. We enrich the choice set, consequently obtaining uniqueness results that were not possible in Kreps’ model. We consider several representations and allow the agent to prefer commitment in some contingencies. In the representations, the agent acts as if she had coherent beliefs about a set of possible future Ž. ex post preferences, each of which is an expected-utility preference. We show that this set of ex post preferences, called the subjectie state space, is essentially unique given the restriction that all ex post preferences are expected-utility preferences and is minimal even without this restriction. Because the subjective state space is identified, the way ex post utilities are aggregated into an ex ante ranking is also essentially unique. Hence when a representation that is additive across states exists, the additivity is meaningful in the sense that all representations are intrinsically additive. Uniqueness enables us to show that the size of the subjective state space provides a measure of the agent’s uncertainty about future contingencies and that the way the states are aggregated indicates whether these contingencies lead to a desire for flexibility or commitment.
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Cited by
Gul, F., & Pesendorfer, W. (2001) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00252 · Cited by 1,200
A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control
Fudenberg, D., & Levine, D. K. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.5.1449 · Cited by 927
Theory of Decision under Uncertainty
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Revealed Preference, Rational Inattention, and Costly Information Acquisition
Caplin, A., & Dean, M. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20140117 · Cited by 498
Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption
Gul, F., & Pesendorfer, W. (2004) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00480.x · Cited by 472
Metadata
- Authors
- Dekel, E., Lipman, B. L., & Rustichini, A.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2001-07
- Volume
- 69
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 891-934
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0262
- OpenAlex
- W2137248257
- Cited by
- 328
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 5.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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