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Individual characteristics, institutional incentives and electoral abstention in Western Europe
Open accessAbstract
This article examines the interaction between individual characteristics and institutional incentives in non–voting, with a special focus on the interaction between these two types of explanatory variables. The analysis of survey and contextual data for parliamentary elections in 15 Western European countries shows that the effect of individual resources and motivations on abstention is not constant across different countries. Conversely, the effect of institutional incentives (compulsory voting, voting facilities, electoral thresholds of representation and preference expression) on non–voting depends on the elector's level of resources and motivations. One of the four institutional incentives considered has even opposite effects for citizens with different individual characteristics. The analysis also shows that when analysing interactions it is fundamental to distinguish between magnitudes and consequences of the effects of explanatory variables. This has important implications for the interpretation of the results of logistic regression analysis.
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Citations
Cites
Participation and Democratic Theory
Pateman, C. (1970) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511720444 · Cited by 6,159
POWELL, G. B. (1982) · doi:10.4159/9780674042353 · Cited by 874
Does proportional representation foster voter turnout?
Blais, A., & Carty, R. K. (1990) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.1990.tb00227.x · Cited by 460
Cited by
Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established Democracies since 1945
Franklin, M. N., Eijk, C. V. D., Evans, D., Fotos, M., Hirczy de Mino, W., Marsh, M., & Wessels, B. (2004) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511616884 · Cited by 1,421
Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior
Norris, P. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511790980 · Cited by 918
Explaining voter turnout: A review of aggregate-level research
Geys, B. (2006) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2005.09.002 · Cited by 860
Electoral engineering: voting rules and political behavior
(2004) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.42-1232 · Cited by 845
The embarrassment of riches? A meta-analysis of individual-level research on voter turnout
Smets, K., & van Ham, C. (2013) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2012.12.006 · Cited by 799
Metadata
- Authors
- Perea, E. A.
- Venue
- European Journal of Political Research
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2002-08
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 643-673
- ISSN
- 0304-4130 (ISSN-L)
- 1475-6765
- OpenAlex
- W2018236210
- Cited by
- 159
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 86.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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