Contract farming and smallholder incentives to produce high quality: experimental evidence from the Vietnamese dairy sector
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In emerging markets for high‐value food products in developing countries, processing companies search for efficient ways to source raw material of high quality. One widely embraced approach is contract farming. But relatively little is known about the appropriate design of financial incentives in a small farm context. We use the example of the Vietnamese dairy sector to analyze the effectiveness of existing contracts between a processor and smallholder farmers in terms of incentivizing the production of high quality milk. A framed field experiment is conducted to evaluate the impact of two incentive instruments, a price penalty for low quality and a bonus for consistent high quality milk, on farmers’ investment in quality‐improving inputs. Statistical analysis suggests that the penalty drives farmers into higher input use, resulting in better output quality. The bonus payment generates even higher quality milk. We also find that input choice levels depend on farmers’ socio‐economic characteristics such as wealth, while individual risk preferences seem to be less important. Implications for the design of contracts with smallholders are discussed.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Counterfactuals and Causal Inference: Methods and Principles for Social Research
Morgan, S. L., & Winship, C. (2007) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804564 · Cited by 1,146
Chapter 113 Men, Women and Risk Aversion: Experimental Evidence
Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (2008) · Handbook of Experimental Economics Results · doi:10.1016/s1574-0722(07)00113-8 · Cited by 924 · cited 2×
“The risk literature suggests 20 that women and older individuals often tend to be more risk averse (Eckel and Grossman 2008).”
BackgroundMarket power and rents in global supply chains
Swinnen, J. F. M., & Vandeplas, A. (2010) · Agricultural Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1574-0862.2010.00493.x · Cited by 110 · cited 1×
“Various studies on the consequences of oligopsony power suggest that biased pricing can affect farmers’ investment behavior (Gow and Swinnen, 1998; Young and Hobbs, 2002; Vukina and Leegomonchai, 2006; Swinnen and Vandeplas, 2010).”
Background
Cited by
Does contract farming improve welfare? A review
Bellemare, M. F., & Bloem, J. R. (2018) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.08.018 · Cited by 280
Swinnen, J., & Kuijpers, R. (2019) · Food Policy · doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2017.07.013 · Cited by 104
Benedek, Z., Fertő, I., & Molnár, A. (2018) · Agriculture and Human Values · doi:10.1007/s10460-017-9834-4 · Cited by 71
Metadata
- Authors
- Saenger, C., Qaim, M., Torero, M., & Viceisza, A.
- Venue
- Agricultural Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2013-02-18
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 297-308
- ISSN
- 0169-5150 (ISSN-L)
- 1574-0862
- OpenAlex
- W2114467962
- Cited by
- 129
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 19.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.