The Fragility of Consensus: Public Reason, Diversity and Stability
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
J ohn R awls's transition from A T heory of J ustice to P olitical L iberalism was driven by his rejection of T heory's account of stability. The key to his later account of stability is the idea of public reason. We see R awls's account of stability as an attempt to solve a mutual assurance problem. We maintain that R awls's solution fails because his primary assurance mechanism, in the form of public reason, is fragile. His conception of public reason relies on a condition of consensus that we argue is unrealistic in modern, pluralistic democracies. After rejecting Rawls's conception of public reason, we offer an ‘indirect alternative’ that we believe is much more robust. We cite experimental evidence to back up this claim.
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Citations
Cites
A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition
Rawls, J. (1999) · doi:10.4159/9780674042582 · Cited by 9,455
Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992
SALLY, D. (1995) · Rationality and Society · doi:10.1177/1043463195007001004 · Cited by 1,126
Metadata
- Authors
- Thrasher, J., & Vallier, K.
- Venue
- European Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2013-05-03
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 933-954
- ISSN
- 0966-8373 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0378
- OpenAlex
- W1577632295
- Cited by
- 179
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 53.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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