An Evaluation of S pearman's H ypothesis by Manipulating g Saturation
Abstract
Spearman's Hypothesis holds that the magnitude of mean White–Black differences on cognitive tests covaries with the extent to which a test is saturated with g. This paper evaluates Spearman's Hypothesis by manipulating the g saturation of cognitive composites. Using a sample of 16,384 people from the General Aptitude Test Battery database, we show that one can decrease mean racial differences in a g test by altering the g saturation of the measure. Consistent with Spearman's Hypothesis, the g saturation of a test is positively and strongly related to the magnitude of White–Black mean racial differences in test scores. We demonstrate that the reduction in mean racial differences accomplished by reducing the g saturation in a measure is obtained at the cost of lower validity and increased prediction errors. We recommend that g tests varying in mean racial differences be examined to determine if the Spearman's Hypothesis is a viable explanation for the results.
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Using average g loadings provided by Jensen, correlation between African-/European-American score differences and g loadings is r = 0.64, while correlation between African-American-only g loadings and score differences between most- and least-African in this group is r = 0.84.
“Indeed, using average g loadings provided by Jensen [19] (cf.[106]) the correlation between the African-/European-American score differences and g loadings is r = 0.64, while the correlation between the African-American-only g loadings and the score differences between the most-and least-African in this group is r = 0.84.”
From Global Ancestry and Cognitive Ability (2019) · cites this paper as [19]
Cites
Mainstream science on intelligence: An editorial with 52 signatories, history, and bibliography
Gottfredson, L. S. (1997) · Intelligence · doi:10.1016/s0160-2896(97)90011-8 · Cited by 1,137 · see citing works
Valentin Kvist, A., & Gustafsson, J.-E. (2008) · Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.intell.2007.08.004 · Cited by 188 · see citing works
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Global Ancestry and Cognitive Ability
Lasker, J., Pesta, B. J., Fuerst, J. G. R., & Kirkegaard, E. O. W. (2019) · Psych · doi:10.3390/psych1010034 · Cited by 32 · see citing works
- Authors
- McDaniel, M. A., & Kepes, S.
- Affiliations
- Virginia Commonwealth University (US)
- ORCID
- Kepes, Sven
- Venue
- International Journal of Selection and Assessment
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2014-10-27
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 333-342
- ISSN
- 0965-075X (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2389
- OpenAlex
- W2140201444
- Cited by
- 7
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2025: 2 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 2 · 2019: 2
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- International Journal of Selection and Assessment (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Cognitive Abilities and Testing
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Psychometric Methodologies and Testing
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Intergenerational and Educational Inequality Studies
- Keywords
- Spearman's hypothesis, general intelligence, cognitive test scores, test validity, prediction error, General Aptitude Test Battery
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