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Cited by 242

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ADVERSE SELECTION IN ELECTRONIC MARKETS: EVIDENCE FROM ONLINE STAMP AUCTIONS

Dewan, Sanjeev, Hsu, Vernon · 2004 · The Journal of Industrial Economics

Abstract

We analyze adverse selection costs in online stamp auctions, based on a comparison of prices on eBay with those of matched stamps at a specialty stamps auction site in the U.S., Michael Rogers, Inc. (MR), which we know a priori has low quality uncertainty. We find that buyer prices are 10–15% lower on eBay as compared to MR, and the price difference, increases with the value of the stamps. Consistent with this adverse selection discount we find that the seller reputation mechanism on eBay has an economically modest, although statistically significant, effect on auction price and probability of sale.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.0022-1821.2004.00237.x

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Metadata

Authors
Dewan, S., & Hsu, V.
Venue
The Journal of Industrial Economics
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2004-12
Volume
52
Issue
4
Pages
497-516
ISSN
  • 0022-1821 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-6451
OpenAlex
W1988101710
Cited by
242
References
2
FWCI
19.39
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: ADVERSE SELECTION IN ELECTRONIC MARKETS: EVIDENCE FROM ONLINE STAMP AUCTIONS. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.0022-1821.2004.00237.x
The paper
Dewan, S., & Hsu, V. (2004). ADVERSE SELECTION IN ELECTRONIC MARKETS: EVIDENCE FROM ONLINE STAMP AUCTIONS. The Journal of Industrial Economics. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-1821.2004.00237.x

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.