The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
DEFEATERS AND HIGHER-LEVEL REQUIREMENTS
Abstract
Internalists tend to impose on justification higher‐level requirements, according to which a belief is justified only if the subject has a higher‐level belief (i.e., a belief about the epistemic credentials of a belief). I offer an error theory that explains the appeal of this requirement: analytically, a belief is not justified if we have a defeater for it, but contingently, it is often the case that to avoid having defeaters, our belief must satisfy a higher‐level requirement. I respond to the objection that externalists who endorse this error theory will be forced to accept a radical form of scepticism.
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Citations
Cites
Internalism, Externalism and The No-Defeater Condition
Bergmann, M. (1997) · Synthese · doi:10.1023/a:1004993228686 · Cited by 92
Self-citationExternalist Justification Without Reliability
Bergmann, M. (2004) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00019.x · Cited by 36
Self-citation
Cited by
Justification without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism
Bergmann, M. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0199275742.001.0001 · Cited by 504
Self-citationThe Conflict of Evidence and Coherence
Worsnip, A. (2018) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12246 · Cited by 317
Friedman, J. (2017) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12137 · Cited by 294
Friedman, J. (2013) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.1111/phpe.12026 · Cited by 281
Moore’s Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification
SMITHIES, D. (2012) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00506.x · Cited by 275
Metadata
- Authors
- Bergmann, M.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Quarterly
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2005-07
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 220
- Pages
- 419-436
- ISSN
- 0031-8094 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9213
- OpenAlex
- W2144519367
- Cited by
- 255
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 55.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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