The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget Discipline in Latin American and Caribbean Countries
Open accessAbstract
Recent scholarship on budgeting in Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries indicates that political institutions impact the level of budget discipline. Building upon this previous research, we argue that the principal problem that must be addressed in both the government and the legislature to insure strong fiscal discipline is the common pool resource (CPR) problem. At the cabinet level, the CPR problem arises because ministers consider the implications of decisions on their ministries only. The level of the CPR problem in the legislature depends upon the electoral system. Using a data set of LAC countries for the period 1988–97, we find that executive power in the budget process is most effective in reducing budget deficits when electoral incentives for the personal vote is high in the legislature, while strengthening the president (or prime minister) in countries where the personal vote is low in the legislature has no effect.
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Cites
What To Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data
Beck, N., & Katz, J. N. (1995) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082979 · Cited by 6,840
Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy
Hibbs, D. A. (1977) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400269712 · Cited by 3,368
Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies
Jones, M. P. (1996) · doi:10.1353/book.147213 · Cited by 279
Cited by
Legislative Voting and Accountability
Carey, J. M. (2008) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511810077 · Cited by 466
Hallerberg, M., Rainer Strauch, R., & von Hagen, J. (2009) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511759505 · Cited by 405
Self-citationThe Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas
Neto, O. A. (2006) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414005282381 · Cited by 268
Globalization and the Strengthening of Democracy in the Developing World
Rudra, N. (2005) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00150.x · Cited by 262
Metadata
- Authors
- Hallerberg, M., & Marier, P.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2004-06-08
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 571-587
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-5907
- OpenAlex
- W2025291586
- Cited by
- 177
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 22.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- Hallerberg, M., & Marier, P. (2004). Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget Discipline in Latin American and Caribbean Countries. American Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00088.x
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