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Illusory Causation: Why It Occurs

Lassiter, G. Daniel, Geers, Andrew L., Munhall, Patrick J., Ploutz-Snyder, Robert J., Breitenbecher, David L. · 2002 · Psychological Science
Cited by 89

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Considerable evidence indicates that people overattribute causality to a given stimulus when it is salient or the focus of their attention—the so-called illusory-causation phenomenon. Although illusory causation has proved to be quite robust and generalizable, a compelling explanation for it has not been empirically documented. Four social-attribution studies were conducted to test the hypothesis that illusory causation occurs because salient information is initially registered, or perceptually organized, differently than nonsalient information. The results provide considerable support for the notion that people's literal point of view affects how they initially perceive, or extract, information from an observed interaction, which in turn affects their judgments regarding the causal influence exerted by each interactant.

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Metadata

Authors
Lassiter, G. D., Geers, A. L., Munhall, P. J., Ploutz-Snyder, R. J., & Breitenbecher, D. L.
Venue
Psychological Science
Published
2002-07
Volume
13
Issue
4
Pages
299-305
ISSN
  • 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-9280
OpenAlex
W2162348232
Cited by
89
References
1
FWCI
7.81
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Illusory Causation: Why It Occurs. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.0956-7976.2002..x
The paper
Lassiter, G. D., Geers, A. L., Munhall, P. J., Ploutz-Snyder, R. J., & Breitenbecher, D. L. (2002). Illusory Causation: Why It Occurs. Psychological Science. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0956-7976.2002..x

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