The Nature of Rights
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The twentieth century saw a vigorous debate over the nature of rights.Will theorists argued that the function of rights is to allocate domains of freedom.Interest theorists portrayed rights as defenders of well-being.Each side declared its conceptual analysis to be closer to an ordinary understanding of what rights there are, and to an ordinary understanding of what rights do for rightholders.Neither side could win a decisive victory, and the debate ended in a standoff.1 This article offers a new analysis of rights.The first half of the article sets out an analytical framework adequate for explicating all assertions of rights.This framework is an elaboration of Hohfeld's, designed around a template for displaying the often complex internal structures of rights.Those unfamiliar with Hohfeld's work should find that the exposition here presumes no prior knowledge of it.Those who know Hohfeld will find innovations in how the system is defined and presented.Any theorist wishing to specify precisely what is at stake within a controversy over some particular right may find this framework useful.The analytical framework is then deployed in the second half of the article to resolve the dispute between the will and interest theories.
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Citations
Cites
Epistemic rights and legal rights
Wenar, L. (2003) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/63.2.142 · Cited by 23
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Cited by
The Subjects of Collectively Binding Decisions: Democratic Inclusion and Extraterritorial Law
Beckman, L. (2014) · Ratio Juris · doi:10.1111/raju.12038 · Cited by 49
Metadata
- Authors
- WENAR, L.
- Venue
- Philosophy & Public Affairs
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2005-06-16
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 223-252
- ISSN
- 0048-3915 (ISSN-L)
- 1088-4963
- OpenAlex
- W2048636620
- Cited by
- 262
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 259.64
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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- WENAR, L. (2005). The Nature of Rights. Philosophy & Public Affairs. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2005.00032.x
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