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Disabling the public interest: alcohol strategies and policies for England
Open accessAbstract
In March 2004, two important documents on alcohol policy were published by the British government. One is an Alcohol Harm Reduction Strategy for England (UK Cabinet Office 2004). This document has received more attention, but is arguably of less import. As we shall see, what it offers is a recipe for ineffectiveness at the national level. The second document, the kind which only a lawyer could love, is entitled Draft Guidance issued under Section 182 of the Licensing Act 2003 (UK Ministry of Culture, Media & Sport 2004). The consequences of this document are likely to be much more serious for public health and safety, as it is intended to eviscerate any possibility of effective action on alcohol issues at the local level. In the same month, then, the Blair government has managed to accomplish not only a missed chance at the national level but also a thoroughgoing neutralization of local powers to control the alcohol market in the interests of public health and safety. This deliberate effort to disable the public interest applies directly only to parts of the United Kingdom, but it is of wider significance. As will be discussed, the same government also holds important powers for the whole of the United Kingdom, and there is nowhere else to look for policy decisions on such matters. Further, the UK government has an important voice in the European Union, and in this context has generally sided, as in the Strategy, with British alcohol industry interests at the expense of public health and safety. More generally, in an international context the effort is worth holding up to the light for detailed examination as a textbook case of how industry interests can be brought to bear, through an ideologically friendly central government, to thwart local efforts to deal with the problems which enthusiastic and unchecked alcohol marketing can bring at the street level. In 1998, the government of the United Kingdom stated that it was ‘preparing a new strategy on alcohol’ (UK Department of Health 1998, §9.14), and the next year added that ‘we expect to publish our strategy . . . early in the year 2000’ (UK Department of Health 1999, §2.23). In 2003, a PowerPoint presentation entitled the Interim Analytical Report was published on the web (UK Cabinet Office, 2003). As noted, the strategy has now finally been published (UK Cabinet Office 2004). Prepared by the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, the strategy carries a foreword signed by Tony Blair himself. Although originally billed to be a National Strategy, the final document is a strategy only for England. This presumably partly covers any embarrassment from the fact that, by the time it appeared, every other part of the United Kingdom, including the Isle of Man, already had its alcohol or its drug and alcohol strategy. The downshifting of focus may also reflect that the strategy, as we shall discuss, largely avoids recommending any measures (such as changes in excise tax or in blood–alcohol level for drink-driving) which would require action at a broader level than England. This begs the question of the need still for an alcohol strategy for the United Kingdom, covering the aspects of alcohol policy which can be enacted only by the UK government. Both England and the rest of the United Kingdom are in trouble with respect to alcohol. The Interim Analytical Report and the Strategy itself each document this as best they can, given the spotty nature of available British statistics of alcohol consumption and alcohol-related harms. A further accounting can be found in a recent report from the Academy of Medical Sciences (2004; it should be noted that I was a member of that report's working group). The Strategy's proposals for how to respond to a bad and worsening situation can best be described as bathetic. If one takes the listing at the back of Alcohol—No Ordinary Commodity (Babor et al. 2003), for instance, where preventive measures are ranked roughly on the evidence of their effectiveness, there is an almost total correspondence between the measures proposed in the Strategy's recommendations and the measures which are ranked in the listing as ‘ineffective’. They are all there in the Strategy: school education, voluntary advertising codes, even a half-hearted discussion of alternative entertainment for youth. Conversely, the Strategy eschews almost all the strategies ranked as ‘effective’. For those from the effective end of the list which it does advocate—for instance, brief interventions in primary health care—no new resources are provided, and the problem of actually getting health workers to conduct brief interventions (Roche & Freeman 2004) is not addressed. Concerning drink-driving, the one concrete initiative mentioned is a designated-driver publicity campaign run by an alcohol industry group; again the Strategy chooses a measure for which there is no evidence of effectiveness. The Strategy mentions that the United Kingdom's blood alcohol limit of 0.08% is among the hig
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Cited by
Room, R., Babor, T., & Rehm, J. (2005) · The Lancet · doi:10.1016/s0140-6736(05)17870-2 · Cited by 1,625
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Szmigin, I., Griffin, C., Mistral, W., Bengry-Howell, A., Weale, L., & Hackley, C. (2008) · International Journal of Drug Policy · doi:10.1016/j.drugpo.2007.08.009 · Cited by 321
Handbook of Self-Help Therapies
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Metadata
- Authors
- Room, R.
- Venue
- Addiction
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2004-08-18
- Volume
- 99
- Issue
- 9
- Pages
- 1083-1089
- ISSN
- 0965-2140 (ISSN-L)
- 1360-0443
- OpenAlex
- W2094604581
- Cited by
- 164
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 45.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- Room, R. (2004). Disabling the public interest: alcohol strategies and policies for England. Addiction. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1360-0443.2004.00803.x
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