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A POSITIVE THEORY OF DISCRETIONARY POLICY, THE COST OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT AND THE BENEFITS OF A CONSTITUTION
Open accessAbstract
We offer an explanation of government's preference for discretionary policy action. The main elements are asymmetric information and the ability and desire of governments to maximize reelection prospects. Discretionary policy imposes a social cost. We show that the cost is eliminated if all voters have the same information as the government. An optimal, state contingent policy rule that precommits government through a constitution eliminates the cost by removing government's opportunities to exploit its informational advantage. Rules of this kind, and constitutional restrictions, are difficult to enforce in the presence of uncertainty and different information available to government and the public.
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Citations
Cites
A Rational Theory of the Size of Government
Meltzer, A. H., & Richard, S. F. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261013 · Cited by 5,485
Self-citation
Cited by
Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles
Rogoff, K. (1987) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w2428 · Cited by 1,877
Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles
Rogoff, K., & Sibert, A. (1988) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297526 · Cited by 1,607
Voting for autocracy: hegemonic party survival and its demise in Mexico
(2007) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.44-4695 · Cited by 1,155
Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies
Alesina, A., Mirrlees, J., & Neumann, M. J. M. (1989) · Economic Policy · doi:10.2307/1344464 · Cited by 583
Kopits, G., Symansky, S., GKopits@imf.org, & SSymansky@imf.org (1998) · Occasional Papers · doi:10.5089/9781557757043.084 · Cited by 521
Metadata
- Authors
- CUKIERMAN, A., & MELTZER, A. H.
- Venue
- Economic Inquiry
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1986-07
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 367-388
- ISSN
- 0043-3640 (ISSN-L)
- 0095-2583
- 1465-7295
- OpenAlex
- W2085250245
- Cited by
- 221
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 18.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- CUKIERMAN, A., & MELTZER, A. H. (1986). A POSITIVE THEORY OF DISCRETIONARY POLICY, THE COST OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT AND THE BENEFITS OF A CONSTITUTION. Economic Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1986.tb01817.x
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