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Cited by 401

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

RULES AND DISCRETION WITH NONCOORDINATED MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES

ALESINA, ALBERTO, TABELLINI, GUIDO·1987·Economic Inquiry

Abstract

The time inconsistency of optimal monetary policy is due to the effects of tax distortions. Thus the issue of how to improve upon the time‐consistent suboptimal monetary policy is related to that of the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy. We present a model with three players (the central bark, the fiscal authority, and wage setters) in which distortionary taxes are explicitly modelled. We show that binding commitments to monetary rules are not necessarily welfare improving if monetary and fiscal policy are not coordinated. We also examine the effects of different degrees of independence of the central bank.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1987.tb00764.x

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Metadata

Authors
ALESINA, A., & TABELLINI, G.
Venue
Economic Inquiry
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1987-10
Volume
25
Issue
4
Pages
619-630
ISSN
  • 0043-3640 (ISSN-L)
  • 0095-2583
  • 1465-7295
OpenAlex
W1988193097
Cited by
401
References
13
FWCI
12.20
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: RULES AND DISCRETION WITH NONCOORDINATED MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1987.tb00764.x
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ALESINA, A., & TABELLINI, G. (1987). RULES AND DISCRETION WITH NONCOORDINATED MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES. Economic Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1987.tb00764.x

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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.