The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
RULES AND DISCRETION WITH NONCOORDINATED MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES
Abstract
The time inconsistency of optimal monetary policy is due to the effects of tax distortions. Thus the issue of how to improve upon the time‐consistent suboptimal monetary policy is related to that of the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy. We present a model with three players (the central bark, the fiscal authority, and wage setters) in which distortionary taxes are explicitly modelled. We show that binding commitments to monetary rules are not necessarily welfare improving if monetary and fiscal policy are not coordinated. We also examine the effects of different degrees of independence of the central bank.
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Cites
Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans
Kydland, F. E., & Prescott, E. C. (1977) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260580 · Cited by 7,905
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
Rogoff, K. (1985) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885679 · Cited by 3,688
On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy
Calvo, G. A. (1978) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913836 · Cited by 805
Anticipated inflation and the capital stock in a cash in-advance economy
Stockman, A. C. (1981) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3932(81)90018-0 · Cited by 798
3. Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy
(1990) · Macroeconomic Policy · doi:10.4159/harvard.9780674418950.c4 · Cited by 715
Can international monetary policy cooperation be counterproductive?
Rogoff, K. (1985) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/0022-1996(85)90052-2 · Cited by 574
Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information
Canzoneri, M. B. (1984) · International Finance Discussion Papers · doi:10.17016/ifdp.1984.249 · Cited by 433
Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy
Barro, R., & Gordon, D. (1983) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w1079 · Cited by 397
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation
Katz, L. F. (1986) · NBER Macroeconomics Annual · doi:10.1086/654025 · Cited by 214
Money, debt and deficits in a dynamic game
Tabellini, G. (1986) · Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control · doi:10.1016/s0165-1889(86)80001-x · Cited by 157
Self-citation
Cited by
Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes
Cukierman, A., Web, S. B., & Neyapti, B. (1992) · The World Bank Economic Review · doi:10.1093/wber/6.3.353 · Cited by 950
Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers
Beetsma, R. M. W. J., & Lans Bovenberg, A. (1998) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/s0022-1996(98)00031-2 · Cited by 259
Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Clark, W. R., & Hallerberg, M. (2000) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2586015 · Cited by 252
Metadata
- Authors
- ALESINA, A., & TABELLINI, G.
- Venue
- Economic Inquiry
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1987-10
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 619-630
- ISSN
- 0043-3640 (ISSN-L)
- 0095-2583
- 1465-7295
- OpenAlex
- W1988193097
- Cited by
- 401
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 12.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- ALESINA, A., & TABELLINI, G. (1987). RULES AND DISCRETION WITH NONCOORDINATED MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES. Economic Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1987.tb00764.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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