Reflecting on Scientific Thinking: Children's Understanding of the Hypothesis-Evidence Relation
Abstract
3 experiments were carried out to examine children's understanding of the role of covariation evidence in hypothesis formation. Previous research suggested that it is not until 8 to 11 years of age that children begin to understand how a given pattern of covariation supports a particular hypothesis about which factor is causally responsible for an observed effect. Experiments 1 to 3 employed a different (fake evidence) technique than previous research and showed that by 6 years of age most children understand how evidence would lead a story character to form a different hypothesis than the subject's own. Experiment 3 showed that most 6- and young 7-year-olds understand how a character's future actions (e.g., choice of an object) and predictions of future outcomes depend on the hypothesis he or she holds.
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The fact that young children can verbally counter-argue a false causal claim by providing evidence clearly indicates an initial understanding that evidence is a means of assessing the veracity of claims.
“As also seen in other studies (Maloney and Simon 2006;Manz and Allen 2017;Ruffman et al. 1993;Sandoval et al. 2014;Sodian et al. 1991), the fact that young children can verbally counter-argue a false causal claim by providing evidence clearly indicates an initial understanding that evidence is a means of assessing the veracity of claims.”
From Young Children's Epistemic Operations and Emergent Argumentation in Inquiry‐Based Discussions: The Role of Teacher Questioning and Collaborative Interactions (2025) · cites this paper as Ruffman et al. 1993
Cites
Three-year-olds’ difficulty with false belief: The case for a conceptual deficit
Perner, J., Leekam, S. R., & Wimmer, H. (1987) · British Journal of Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.2044-835x.1987.tb01048.x · Cited by 1,550 · see citing works
Self-citationChildren and adults as intuitive scientists.
Kuhn, D. (1989) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.96.4.674 · Cited by 774 · see citing works
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Caño, L., & Sanz, J. (2025) · Journal of Research in Science Teaching · doi:10.1002/tea.70010 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
- Authors
- Ruffman, T., Perner, J., Olson, D. R., & Doherty, M.
- Affiliations
- University of Sussex (GB)
- University of Toronto (CA)
- Venue
- Child Development
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1993-12
- Volume
- 64
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1617
- ISSN
- 0009-3920 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1974708150
- Cited by
- 159
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 9 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 7
- FWCI
- 3.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Child Development (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- UEA Digital Repository (University of East Anglia) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Social Sciences › Education › Science Education and Pedagogy
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
- Keywords
- hypothesis generation, causal reasoning, children's scientific thinking, causal inference
- MeSH terms
- Child, Child Development, Child, Preschool, Concept Formation, Female, Humans, Learning, Male, Science, Thinking
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