Neutralization and Tax Evasion: How Effective Would a Moral Appeal Be in Improving Compliance to Tax Laws?
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The failure of individuals to pay their taxes in full is a serious budgetary problem for the federal government. Existing research (Schwartz and Orleans, 1967; Grasmick and Scott, 1982) suggests that efforts to increase the guilt feelings experienced for tax evasion might improve compliance. However, neutralization theory (Sykes and Matza, 1957) predicts that guilt feelings can be reduced by neutralization strategies which justify guilt‐producing behavior, compromising the inhibiting effect of guilt feelings. Our research shows that through the use of neutralization strategies which justify tax evasion the inhibiting effect of guilt feelings is sharply reduced. The implications of this finding for tax compliance programs based on appeals to the moral obligation of paying taxes are discussed.
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Citations
Cites
Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency
Sykes, G. M., & Matza, D. (1957) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2089195 · Cited by 5,845
Sanction, fear, and the maintenance of social order
Tittle, C. R. (1977) · Social Forces · doi:10.2307/2577457 · Cited by 161
Cited by
The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour
Kirchler, E., & Braithwaite, V. (2007) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511628238 · Cited by 1,206
Siponen, M., & Vance, A. (2010) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.2307/25750688 · Cited by 945
What Have We Learned from Five Decades of Neutralization Research?
Maruna, S., & Copes, H. (2005) · Crime and Justice · doi:10.1086/655355 · Cited by 771
Fiscal exchange, collective decision institutions, and tax compliance
Alm, J., Jackson, B. R., & McKee, M. (1993) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(93)90003-8 · Cited by 357
THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF PERCEIVED CERTAINTY AND SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT REVISITED*
KLEPPER, S., & NAGIN, D. (1989) · Criminology · doi:10.1111/j.1745-9125.1989.tb01052.x · Cited by 346
Metadata
- Authors
- THURMAN, Q. C., JOHN, C. S., & RIGGS, L.
- Venue
- Law & Policy
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1984-07
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 309-327
- ISSN
- 0265-8240 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9930
- OpenAlex
- W1981340726
- Cited by
- 108
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 9.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Neutralization and Tax Evasion: How Effective Would a Moral Appeal Be in Improving Compliance to Tax Laws? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1467-9930.1984.tb00329.x
- The paper
- THURMAN, Q. C., JOHN, C. S., & RIGGS, L. (1984). Neutralization and Tax Evasion: How Effective Would a Moral Appeal Be in Improving Compliance to Tax Laws? Law & Policy. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9930.1984.tb00329.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.