Having Concepts: a Brief Refutation of the Twentieth Century
The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Abstract
A certain ‘pragmatist’ view of concept possession has defined the mainstream of Anglophone philosophy of language/mind for decades: namely, that to have the concept C is to be able to distinguish Cs from non‐Cs, and/or to recognize the validity of certain C‐involving inferences. The present paper offers three arguments why no such account could be viable. An alternative ‘Cartesian’ view is outlined, according to which having C is being able to think about Cs ‘as such’. Some consequences of the proposed paradigm shift are briefly considered.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension
Clark, A. (2008) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195333213.001.0001 · Cited by 2,201
Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading
Goldman, A. I. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0195138929.001.0001 · Cited by 1,470
LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited
Rives, B. (2009) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515080903157916 · Cited by 316
Mind Design and Minimal Syntax
Hinzen, W. (2006) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289257.001.0001 · Cited by 273
Metadata
- Authors
- Fodor, J.
- Venue
- Mind & Language
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2004-02
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 29-47
- ISSN
- 0268-1064 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0017
- OpenAlex
- W2120627793
- Cited by
- 218
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 25.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Having Concepts: a Brief Refutation of the Twentieth Century. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2004.00245.x
- The paper
- Fodor, J. (2004). Having Concepts: a Brief Refutation of the Twentieth Century. Mind & Language. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2004.00245.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.