The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
Abstract
A speaker wishes to persuade a listener to accept a certain request. The conditions under which the request is justified, from the listener's point of view, depend on the values of two aspects. The values of the aspects are known only to the speaker and the listener can check the value of at most one. A mechanism specifies a set of messages that the speaker can send and a rule that determines the listener's response, namely, which aspect he checks and whether he accepts or rejects the speaker's request. We study mechanisms that maximize the probability that the listener accepts the request when it is justified and rejects the request when it is unjustified, given that the speaker maximizes the probability that his request is accepted. We show that a simple optimal mechanism exists and can be found by solving a linear programming problem in which the set of constraints is derived from what we call the L-principle.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Strategic information transmission
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
Townsend, R. M. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0 · Cited by 3,204
Cited by
Coarse Thinking and Persuasion*
Mullainathan, S., Schwartzstein, J., & Shleifer, A. (2008) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2008.123.2.577 · Cited by 375
Consensus Building: How to Persuade a Group
Caillaud, B., & Tirole, J. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.5.1877 · Cited by 128
Metadata
- Authors
- Glazer, J., & Rubinstein, A.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2004-11
- Volume
- 72
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1715-1736
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0262
- OpenAlex
- W2144841443
- Cited by
- 163
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 5.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: On Optimal Rules of Persuasion. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00551.x
- The paper
- Glazer, J., & Rubinstein, A. (2004). On Optimal Rules of Persuasion. Econometrica. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00551.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.