The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to Dissent: Evidence from the US Federal Reserve
Abstract
Transparency in committee decision making may have clear benefits by making members more accountable to outside observers. We consider one potential cost: the possibility that publishing records of deliberations will make members more reluctant to offer dissenting opinions. We construct a model that compares incentives for members with ‘career concerns’ to voice dissent when deliberations occur in public or in private. We test the model using an original dataset based on deliberations of the Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee, asking whether the FOMC's 1993 decision to begin releasing transcripts of its meetings has altered incentives for dissent. We find evidence that this is indeed the case.
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Cites
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Ottaviani, M., & Sørensen, P. N. (2006) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2004.08.005 · Cited by 180
Cited by
The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government
Maskin, E., & Tirole, J. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828042002606 · Cited by 904
Transparency and Deliberation Within the FOMC: A Computational Linguistics Approach*
Hansen, S., McMahon, M., & Prat, A. (2018) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjx045 · Cited by 631
Husted, L., Rogers, J., & Sun, B. (2020) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2019.07.009 · Cited by 463
Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness
Crowe, C., & Meade, E. E. (2008) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.06.004 · Cited by 311
Self-citationThe Evolution of Central Bank Governance around the World
Crowe, C., & Meade, E. E. (2007) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.21.4.69 · Cited by 302
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Metadata
- Authors
- Meade, E. E., & Stasavage, D.
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2008-03-19
- Volume
- 118
- Issue
- 528
- Pages
- 695-717
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0297
- OpenAlex
- W1579535553
- Cited by
- 189
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 19.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Meade, E. E., & Stasavage, D. (2008). Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to Dissent: Evidence from the US Federal Reserve. The Economic Journal. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02138.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.