Accountability in Accounting? The Politics of Private Rule-Making in the Public Interest
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Over recent decades governments have increasingly delegated domestic and international regulatory functions to private-sector agents. This article examines the reasons for such delegation and how private agents differ from public ones, and then analyzes the politics of regulation post delegation. It argues that the key difference between delegation to a public agent and delegation to a private one is that in the latter case a multiple-principals problem emerges that is qualitatively different from the one usually considered in the literature. An agent's action will be determined by the relative tightness of competing principal–agent relationships. This tightness is a function of the relative importance of each principal for the agent's financial and operational viability as well as its effectiveness in rule making. Further, the article posits that exogenous changes in the macro-political climate can deeply affect the nature of principal–agent relationships. The authors test their hypotheses about the politics of regulation in the postdelegation period through the study of accounting standards setting in the United States, a case of delegation of regulatory authority to a private agent that goes back to the New Deal era and has received renewed public attention in the wake of recent corporate financial scandals.
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Cites
Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis
Pierson, P. (2004) · doi:10.1515/9781400841080 · Cited by 4,957
Cited by
Constructing and contesting legitimacy and accountability in polycentric regulatory regimes
Black, J. (2008) · Regulation & Governance · doi:10.1111/j.1748-5991.2008.00034.x · Cited by 1,215
Institutional Choice and Global Commerce
Jupille, J., Mattli, W., & Snidal, D. (2013) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139855990 · Cited by 378
Self-citationWhen Do Institutions “Bite”? Historical Institutionalism and the Politics of Institutional Change
Capoccia, G. (2016) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414015626449 · Cited by 340
Predicting Public Sector Accountability: From Agency Drift to Forum Drift
Schillemans, T., & Busuioc, M. (2015) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/muu024 · Cited by 290
“Accountability in this view, then, is essentially a process of curtailing agency loss in delegation (Mattli and Büthe 2005, 401; Strøm 2000), of maximizing bureaucratic compliance by constraining and molding the conduct of the agent in line with the preferences of the principal.”
Becker, M. (2019) · Regulation & Governance · doi:10.1111/rego.12250 · Cited by 71
Metadata
- Authors
- MATTLI, W., & BUTHE, T.
- Venue
- Governance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2005-07
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 399-429
- ISSN
- 0952-1895 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0491
- OpenAlex
- W1969296778
- Cited by
- 174
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 20.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- MATTLI, W., & BUTHE, T. (2005). Accountability in Accounting? The Politics of Private Rule-Making in the Public Interest. Governance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2005.00282.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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