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Agency Escape: Decentralization or Dominance of the European Commission in the Modernization of Competition Policy?

WILKS, STEPHEN · 2005 · Governance
Cited by 161

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

The “modernization” reforms of European antitrust are summarized and interpreted. The article uses principal–agent analysis enhanced by socio-institutional insights. The reforms in policy implementation are of historic importance. While they appear to promise decentralization to national competition authorities, more sophisticated analysis points to an increase in the centralized power of the Commission. The novel instrument of a supranational European Competition Network creates a redesigned relationship between the Commission and the member states that carries high risks of incoherence. Modernization driven by a legal epistemic community carries a less obvious risk that increased power of competition policy will unduly reinforce liberal market disciplines through a juridification of the European competition regime.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1468-0491.2005.00283.x

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Metadata

Authors
WILKS, S.
Venue
Governance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2005-07
Volume
18
Issue
3
Pages
431-452
ISSN
  • 0952-1895 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-0491
OpenAlex
W2165759449
Cited by
161
References
1
FWCI
35.62
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Agency Escape: Decentralization or Dominance of the European Commission in the Modernization of Competition Policy? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2005.00283.x
The paper
WILKS, S. (2005). Agency Escape: Decentralization or Dominance of the European Commission in the Modernization of Competition Policy? Governance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2005.00283.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.