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Cited by 183

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The Politics of Punishment: Evaluating Political Explanations of Incarceration Rates

Smith, Kevin B. · 2004 · The Journal of Politics

Abstract

Why have incarceration rates dramatically increased even as crime rates have remained stable or even declined? This is a question of considerable policy and theoretical relevance that currently has no satisfactory answer. I attempt to address this question by examining the key political explanations of prison populations and the unit of analysis and data limitation obstacles that make it difficult to conduct a comprehensive empirical analysis of these frameworks. I address these issues and undertake such an analysis using a pooled state-level analysis covering the years 1980–1995. Results suggest that the growth in prison populations has little to do with changes in crime rates or government response to citizen attitudes. Instead it is the most basic elements of the political environment (partisanship and elections) and the continuing legacy of racial social cleavages that explain why incarceration rates have increased.

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Metadata

Authors
Smith, K. B.
Venue
The Journal of Politics
Published
2004-08
Volume
66
Issue
3
Pages
925-938
ISSN
  • 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-2508
OpenAlex
W2117912394
Cited by
183
References
1
FWCI
19.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Politics of Punishment: Evaluating Political Explanations of Incarceration Rates. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2004.00283.x
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Smith, K. B. (2004). The Politics of Punishment: Evaluating Political Explanations of Incarceration Rates. The Journal of Politics. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2004.00283.x

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.