Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 165

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

RISKY DEBT MATURITY CHOICE IN A SEQUENTIAL GAME EQUILIBRIUM

Kale, Jayant R., Noe, Thomas H.·1990·Journal of Financial Research

Abstract

In this paper the choice of risky debt maturity structure is analyzed in a sequential game framework. The focus is on the set of viable equilibria when there are no transaction costs associated with the choice of debt maturity structure. It is shown that when changes in firm value are independent over time, both short‐ and long‐term debt pooling are Nash sequential equilibrium outcomes. However, only the short‐term debt pooling outcome satisfies the universal divinity refinement. Relaxing the assumption of independent changes in firm value, it is demonstrated that a separating equilibrium in which higher‐quality firms issue short‐term debt and low‐quality firms issue long‐term debt may exist. Furthermore, conditions exist under which long‐term debt pooling is the universally divine outcome.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/j.1475-6803.1990.tb00545.x

Cites

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cited by

See all 165

Metadata

Authors
Kale, J. R., & Noe, T. H.
Venue
Journal of Financial Research
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1990-06
Volume
13
Issue
2
Pages
155-166
ISSN
  • 0270-2592 (ISSN-L)
  • 1475-6803
OpenAlex
W2110014964
Cited by
165
References
0
FWCI
1.88
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: RISKY DEBT MATURITY CHOICE IN A SEQUENTIAL GAME EQUILIBRIUM. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1475-6803.1990.tb00545.x
The paper
Kale, J. R., & Noe, T. H. (1990). RISKY DEBT MATURITY CHOICE IN A SEQUENTIAL GAME EQUILIBRIUM. Journal of Financial Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6803.1990.tb00545.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.