Cited by 200Taxation and Compliance StudiesCrime Patterns and InterventionsReligion and Society Interactions

“Render Unto Caesar What Is Caesar's”: Religiosity and Taxpayers' Inclinations to Cheat

Grasmick, Haroid G., Bursik, Robert J., Cochran, John K.·1991·The Sociological Quarterly

Abstract

Previous research on the relationship between religiosity and involvement in illegal behavior overlooks Hirschi and Stark's original concern with religion as a sanctioning system. While Hirschi and Stark proposed that religion affects compliance with the law by promising heaven and threatening damnation, this study suggests that its sanctions are self-imposed shame and socially-imposed embarrassment. Shame and embarrassment are compatible with a rational choice perspective on illegal behavior—they lower the expected utility of crime and, thus, its likelihood. These two threats stem from two conceptually distinct dimensions of religiosity. People strongly self-identified as religious are more likely to feel ashamed if they violate the law; those involved in a social network based on religion are more likely to be embarrassed. An adult sample's responses to a question concerning the likelihood of cheating on income taxes in the future tests these hypotheses. The threat of shame emanating from religious identity salience is a stronger deterrent than that of embarrassment.

Integrity signals

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1533-8525.1991.tb00356.x

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1 of 1 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • A search uncovered only five studies on tax fraud that included a measure of religiosity.

    “A search through online databases (sociological abstracts, criminal justice abstracts) and other sources uncovered only five studies on tax fraud that included a measure of religiosity (Grasmick, Bursik, and Cochran 1991;Grasmick, Kinsey, and Cochran 1991;Patee, Milner, and Welch 1994;Tittle and Welch 1983;Welch, Tittle, and Patee 1991).”

    From The Effect of Religiosity on Tax Fraud Acceptability: A Cross‐National Analysis (2006) · cites this paper as Grasmick, Bursik, and Cochran 1991

  • Grasmick, Bursik, and Cochran (1991) found religious salience and church attendance were significantly and negatively related to tax fraud at both bivariate and multivariate levels.

    “Grasmick, Bursik, and Cochran (1991) explored the influence of religious salience and church attendance on tax fraud in Oklahoma City.Both variables were significantly and negatively related to tax fraud at both the bivariate and multivariate levels of analysis.”

    From The Effect of Religiosity on Tax Fraud Acceptability: A Cross‐National Analysis (2006) · cites this paper as Grasmick, Bursik, and Cochran 1991

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Authors
Grasmick, H. G., Bursik, R. J., & Cochran, J. K.
Affiliations
University of Oklahoma (US)
Venue
The Sociological Quarterly
Published
1991-06-01
Volume
32
Issue
2
Pages
251-266
ISSN
  • 0038-0253 (ISSN-L)
  • 1533-8525
OpenAlex
W1900404127
Cited by
200
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 11 · 2018: 13 · 2017: 7 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 11 · 2013: 12 · 2012: 5
FWCI
7.77
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Sociological Quarterly (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Taxation and Compliance Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Crime Patterns and Interventions
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Religion and Society Interactions
Keywords
religiosity, income tax compliance, shame, embarrassment, illegal behavior, rational choice, crime deterrence

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