A Comprehensive Network Security Risk Model for Process Control Networks
Abstract
The risk of cyber attacks on process control networks (PCN) is receiving significant attention due to the potentially catastrophic extent to which PCN failures can damage the infrastructures and commodity flows that they support. Risk management addresses the coupled problems of (1) reducing the likelihood that cyber attacks would succeed in disrupting PCN operation and (2) reducing the severity of consequences in the event of PCN failure or manipulation. The Network Security Risk Model (NSRM) developed in this article provides a means of evaluating the efficacy of candidate risk management policies by modeling the baseline risk and assessing expectations of risk after the implementation of candidate measures. Where existing risk models fall short of providing adequate insight into the efficacy of candidate risk management policies due to shortcomings in their structure or formulation, the NSRM provides model structure and an associated modeling methodology that captures the relevant dynamics of cyber attacks on PCN for risk analysis. This article develops the NSRM in detail in the context of an illustrative example.
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Several proposals (Henry and Haimes, 2009; LeMay et al., 2011; McQueen et al., 2006; Patel et al., 2008) perform comparison of risk metrics between different security configurations of a system.
“There are though several proposals (Henry and Haimes, 2009; LeMay et al., 2011; McQueen et al., 2006; Patel et al., 2008), which we mark with regarding risk evaluation in Table 7, where the comparison of risk metrics is performed between differ-ent security configurations of a system.”
From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Henry and Haimes, 2009
Attacks on protocol implementation can cause failures resulting in possible exploits.
“Attacks on protocol implementation [37] can cause failures resulting in possible exploits [8].”
From Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: A survey of techniques (2017) · cites this paper as [37]
Modbus protocol can be attacked with varying consequences.
“For example, Modbus protocol can be attacked as reported in [8], [37] with varying consequences [37].”
From Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: A survey of techniques (2017) · cites this paper as [37]
Cites
Haimes, Y. Y., & Chittester, C. G. (2005) · Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management · doi:10.2202/1547-7355.1117 · Cited by 46 · see citing works
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A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems
Cherdantseva, Y., Burnap, P., Blyth, A., Eden, P., Jones, K., Soulsby, H., & Stoddart, K. (2016) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2015.09.009 · Cited by 606 · see citing works
Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: A survey of techniques
Nazir, S., Patel, S., & Patel, D. (2017) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2017.06.010 · Cited by 167 · see citing works
“A Network Security Risk Model (NSRM) for cyber risk analysis of the control system is proposed in [90].”
BackgroundMethod
- Authors
- Henry, M. H., & Haimes, Y. Y.
- Affiliations
- Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (US)
- University of Virginia (US)
- Corresponding author
- Henry, Matthew H.
- Venue
- Risk Analysis
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2009-01-23
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 223-248
- ISSN
- 0272-4332 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-6924
- OpenAlex
- W2164824840
- Cited by
- 42
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 3 · 2013: 2 · 2012: 1
- FWCI
- 3.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Risk Analysis (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Civil and Structural Engineering › Infrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis
- Keywords
- process control networks, cyberattack risk, risk management, risk assessment, industrial control systems
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