The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis
Abstract
This study examines the role of public notice and comment in the development of 42 rules. These procedures can provide useful information to policy makers about the preferences of those who stand to be affected by agency actions. More importantly, they serve as cues for the accommodation of interests and the resolution of conflict through processes that are grounded in agencies' accountability to political officials. Yet, an examination of the interrelationship between formal, procedural constraints and the informal processes surrounding them reveals that the effects of notice and comment in promoting bureaucratic responsiveness are limited in ways that have received little systematic analysis. A consideration of the tension between the instrumental goal of procedural accountability and the political tasks that often dominate bureaucratic policy making suggests that it is desirable to return to the original use of notice and comment as a device for exposing agencies to the views of affected interests.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control
(1987) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036930 · Cited by 2,224
Weingast, B. R., & Moran, M. J. (1983) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261181 · Cited by 1,431
Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment
Hečlo, H. (1978) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,239
McCubbins, M. D., Noll, R. G., & Weingast, B. R. (1989) · Virginia Law Review · doi:10.2307/1073179 · Cited by 1,207
The Forms and Limits of Adjudication
Fuller, L. L., & Winston, K. (1978) · Harvard Law Review · doi:10.2307/1340368 · Cited by 939
(2004) · Dictionary of Strategy: Strategic Management A-Z · doi:10.4135/9781452229805.n17 · Cited by 938
The Reformation of American Administrative Law
Stewart, R. B. (1975) · Harvard Law Review · doi:10.2307/1340207 · Cited by 590
Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB
Moe, T. M. (1985) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1956250 · Cited by 544
Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry.
Black, D. J., & Davis, K. C. (1970) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2093261 · Cited by 435
Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements
Wood, B. D. (1988) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1958066 · Cited by 423
Cited by
The Internet and democratic citizenship: theory, practice and policy
(2010) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.47-5308 · Cited by 475
Whose voice counts? The role of large language models in public commenting
Arsenault, A. C., & Kreps, S. (2026) · Big Data & Society · doi:10.1177/20539517261419341 · Cited by 2
“Indeed, empirical studies suggest that in many rulemaking processes, only a small fraction of the public participate — with most submissions coming from business groups, lawyers, or lobbyists (Coglianese, 2006; Golden, 1998; Kim, 2011; West, 2004).”
Metadata
- Authors
- West, W. F.
- Venue
- Public Administration Review
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2004-01-07
- Volume
- 64
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 66-80
- ISSN
- 0033-3352 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6210
- OpenAlex
- W2091370421
- Cited by
- 267
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 48.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2004.00347.x
- The paper
- West, W. F. (2004). Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis. Public Administration Review. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2004.00347.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.