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Agency, Delayed Compensation, and the Structure of Executive Remuneration
Open accessAbstract
In this paper we examine the factors affecting the structure of executives' compensation packages. We focus particularly on the role of various types of delayed compensation as means of “bonding” executives to their firms. The basic problem is to design a compensation package that rewards actions that are in the long‐run interest of the stockholders. Firms must take into account their ability to discern unfortunate circumstances from mismanagement, the extent to which a compensation package forces the executive to face risks beyond his control, and the willingness of a given executive to bear this risk. We use our theory to interpret some executive compensation data from the early 1970s.
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Cites
The pricing of options and corporate liabilities
Black, F., & Scholes, M. (1973) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260062 · Cited by 29,074
Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation
Stiglitz, J. E. (1982) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(82)90020-2 · Cited by 761
Cited by
Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance
Mehran, H. (1995) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(94)00809-f · Cited by 2,086
The Composition of Boards of Directors and Strategic Control: Effects on Corporate Strategy
Baysinger, B., & Hoskisson, R. E. (1990) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/258106 · Cited by 1,418
Cho, T. S., & Hambrick, D. C. (2006) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1060.0192 · Cited by 919
HOW MUCH DOES THE CEO MATTER? THE ROLE OF MANAGERIAL DISCRETION IN THE SETTING OF CEO COMPENSATION.
Finkelstein, S., & Boyd, B. K. (1998) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/257101 · Cited by 799
ORGANIZATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE.
Gerhart, B., & Milkovich, G. T. (1990) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256286 · Cited by 716
Metadata
- Authors
- EATON, J., & ROSEN, H. S.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1983-12
- Volume
- 38
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1489-1505
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W1992316020
- Cited by
- 171
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 10.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- EATON, J., & ROSEN, H. S. (1983). Agency, Delayed Compensation, and the Structure of Executive Remuneration. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb03836.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.