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Cited by 171

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Agency, Delayed Compensation, and the Structure of Executive Remuneration

Open access
EATON, JONATHAN, ROSEN, HARVEY S.·1983·The Journal of Finance

Abstract

In this paper we examine the factors affecting the structure of executives' compensation packages. We focus particularly on the role of various types of delayed compensation as means of “bonding” executives to their firms. The basic problem is to design a compensation package that rewards actions that are in the long‐run interest of the stockholders. Firms must take into account their ability to discern unfortunate circumstances from mismanagement, the extent to which a compensation package forces the executive to face risks beyond his control, and the willingness of a given executive to bear this risk. We use our theory to interpret some executive compensation data from the early 1970s.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb03836.x

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Metadata

Authors
EATON, J., & ROSEN, H. S.
Venue
The Journal of Finance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1983-12
Volume
38
Issue
5
Pages
1489-1505
ISSN
  • 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-6261
OpenAlex
W1992316020
Cited by
171
References
2
FWCI
10.15
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Agency, Delayed Compensation, and the Structure of Executive Remuneration. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb03836.x
The paper
EATON, J., & ROSEN, H. S. (1983). Agency, Delayed Compensation, and the Structure of Executive Remuneration. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb03836.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.