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Cited by 714

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions

AGRAWAL, ANUP, MANDELKER, GERSHON N.·1987·The Journal of Finance
DOI 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb03914.x
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Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between common stock and option holdings of managers and the choice of investment and financing decisions by firms. The authors find support for the hypothesis of a positive relationship between the security holdings of managers and the changes in firm variance and in financial leverage. This conclusion is based on samples of acquiring and divesting firms. The findings are consistent with the hypothesis that executive security holdings have a role in reducing agency problems.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb03914.x

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Metadata

Authors
AGRAWAL, A., & MANDELKER, G. N.
Venue
The Journal of Finance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1987-09
Volume
42
Issue
4
Pages
823-837
ISSN
  • 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-6261
DOI
10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb03914.x
OpenAlex
W1999364636
Cited by
714
References
1
FWCI
33.45
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb03914.x
The paper
AGRAWAL, A., & MANDELKER, G. N. (1987). Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb03914.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.