The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Banking Panics, Information, and Rational Expectations Equilibrium
Open accessAbstract
This paper shows that bank runs can be modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon. We demonstrate that some aspects of the intuitive “story” that bank runs start with fears of insolvency of banks can be rigorously modeled. If individuals observe long “lines” at the bank, they correctly infer that there is a possibility that the bank is about to fail and precipitate a bank run. However, bank runs occur even when no one has any adverse information. Extra market constraints such as suspension of convertibility can prevent bank runs and result in superior allocations.
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Citations
Cites
Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
Diamond, D. W., & Dybvig, P. H. (1983) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261155 · Cited by 9,369
On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets
Stiglitz, J. E., & Grossman, S. J. (1980) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8765r99 · Cited by 3,645
Information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy
Diamond, D. W., & Verrecchia, R. E. (1981) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(81)90026-x · Cited by 1,067
A Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium for Multi-Asset Securities Markets
Admati, A. R. (1985) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911659 · Cited by 778
Distinguishing Panics and Information-based Bank Runs: Welfare and Policy Implications
Jacklin, C. J., & Bhattacharya, S. (1988) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261552 · Cited by 709
Radio Spectrum Allocation: Role of the Market
Melody, W. H. (2016) · American Economic Review · Cited by 610
Preference shocks, liquidity, and central bank policy
Bhattacharya, S., & Gale, D. (1987) · New Approaches to Monetary Economics · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511759628.005 · Cited by 510
Bank suspension of convertibility
Gorton, G. (1985) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3932(85)90063-7 · Cited by 264
On the existence of rational expectations equilibrium
Anderson, R. M., & Sonnenschein, H. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90004-7 · Cited by 82
Cited by
The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements
Calomiris, C. W., & Kahn, C. M. (1991) · American Economic Review · doi:10.7916/d8th8x53 · Cited by 1,470
Sequential Sales, Learning, and Cascades
WELCH, I. (1992) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04406.x · Cited by 1,298
Rational herding in financial economics
Devenow, A., & Welch, I. (1996) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(95)00073-9 · Cited by 1,263
Demand–Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs
GOLDSTEIN, I., & PAUZNER, A. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00762.x · Cited by 1,199
Allen, F., & Gale, D. (1998) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00052 · Cited by 1,010
Metadata
- Authors
- CHARI, V. V., & JAGANNATHAN, R.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1988-07
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 749-761
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2111162596
- Cited by
- 708
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 12.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.