The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Disclosure Decisions by Firms and the Competition for Price Efficiency
Abstract
This paper develops a model of the relationship between investment decisions by firms and the efficiency of the market prices of their securities. It is shown that more efficient security prices can lead to more efficient investment decisions. This provides firms with the incentive to increase price efficiency by voluntarily disclosing information about the firm. Disclosure decisions are studied. It is shown that firms may expend more resources on disclosure than is socially optimal. This is in contrast to the concern implicit in mandatory disclosure rules that firms will expend too few resources on disclosure.
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Citations
Cites
Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading
Kyle, A. S. (1985) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913210 · Cited by 9,580
A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with Incomplete Information
MERTON, R. C. (1987) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb04565.x · Cited by 5,811
Verrecchia, R. E. (1983) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(83)90011-3 · Cited by 3,481
A Theory of Intraday Patterns: Volume and Price Variability
Admati, A. R., & Pfleiderer, P. (1988) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/1.1.3 · Cited by 3,119
The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity
HIRSHLEIFER, J. (1978) · Uncertainty in Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-214850-7.50038-3 · Cited by 1,571
Optimal Release of Information By Firms
DIAMOND, D. W. (1985) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb02364.x · Cited by 1,102
Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial IncentivesPreprint
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. (1982) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 1,075
The Economics of Information and Uncertainty
McCall, J. J. (1982) · University of Chicago Press eBooks · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226555652.001.0001 · Cited by 861
Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors
Easterbrook, F. H., & Fischel, D. R. (1984) · Virginia Law Review · doi:10.2307/1073082 · Cited by 268
Mandatory vs. Voluntary Disclosures: The Cases of Financial and Real Externalities
Dye, R. A. (1990) · The Accounting Review · Cited by 191
Cited by
Cross-Sectional Determinants of Analyst Ratings of Corporate Disclosures
Lang, M., & Lundholm, R. (1993) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491273 · Cited by 2,637
Corporate Disclosure Policy and Analyst Behavior.
Lang, M. H., & Lundholm, R. J. (1996) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/tar-9611271989 · Cited by 2,633
Accounting Information, Disclosure, and the Cost of Capital
LAMBERT, R., LEUZ, C., & VERRECCHIA, R. E. (2007) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-679x.2007.00238.x · Cited by 2,586
Verrecchia, R. E. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00025-8 · Cited by 2,303
Market microstructure: A survey
Madhavan, A. (2000) · Journal of Financial Markets · doi:10.1016/s1386-4181(00)00007-0 · Cited by 1,126
Metadata
- Authors
- FISHMAN, M. J., & HAGERTY, K. M.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1989-07
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 633-646
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2155809871
- Cited by
- 434
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 17.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.