The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Long‐Lived Private Information and Imperfect Competition
Abstract
We develop a multi‐period auction model in which multiple privately informed agents strategically exploit their long‐lived information. We show that such traders compete aggressively and cause most of their common private information to be revealed very rapidly. In the limit as the interval between auctions approaches zero, market depth becomes infinite and all private information is revealed immediately. These results are in contrast to those of Kyle (1985) in which the monopolistic informed trader causes his information to be incorporated into prices gradually, and, when the interval between auctions is vanishingly small, market depth is constant over time.
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Cites
EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS: A REVIEW OF THEORY AND EMPIRICAL WORK*
Malkiel, B. G., & Fama, E. F. (1970) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1970.tb00518.x · Cited by 15,699
Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work
Fama, E. F. (1970) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2325486 · Cited by 13,635
Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading
Kyle, A. S. (1985) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913210 · Cited by 9,580
A Theory of Intraday Patterns: Volume and Price Variability
Admati, A. R., & Pfleiderer, P. (1988) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/1.1.3 · Cited by 3,119
Information, trade and common knowledge
Milgrom, P., & Stokey, N. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90046-1 · Cited by 1,729
Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912767 · Cited by 1,692
Stock Prices and the Supply of Information
BRENNAN, M. J., & HUGHES, P. J. (1991) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04639.x · Cited by 547
Benoit, J.-P., & Krishna, V. (1985) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912660 · Cited by 516
The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Insider Trading on the Stock Market
Laffont, J., & Maskin, E. S. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261669 · Cited by 154
Cited by
Transactions, Volume, and Volatility
Jones, C. M., Kaul, G., & Lipson, M. L. (1994) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/7.4.631 · Cited by 870
Insider trading in credit derivatives☆
ACHARYA, V, & JOHNSON, T. (2007) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.05.003 · Cited by 825
Frankel, R., & Li, X. (2004) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2003.09.004 · Cited by 781
Institutional Investors and the Informational Efficiency of Prices
Boehmer, E., & Kelley, E. K. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhp028 · Cited by 762
Investment analysis and price formation in securities markets
Brennan, M. J., & Subrahmanyam, A. (1995) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(94)00811-e · Cited by 728
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- HOLDEN, C. W., & SUBRAHMANYAM, A.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1992-03
- Volume
- 47
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 247-270
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W1975372592
- Cited by
- 801
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 17.64
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.