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Cited by 801

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Long‐Lived Private Information and Imperfect Competition

HOLDEN, CRAIG W., SUBRAHMANYAM, AVANIDHAR·1992·The Journal of Finance

Abstract

We develop a multi‐period auction model in which multiple privately informed agents strategically exploit their long‐lived information. We show that such traders compete aggressively and cause most of their common private information to be revealed very rapidly. In the limit as the interval between auctions approaches zero, market depth becomes infinite and all private information is revealed immediately. These results are in contrast to those of Kyle (1985) in which the monopolistic informed trader causes his information to be incorporated into prices gradually, and, when the interval between auctions is vanishingly small, market depth is constant over time.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb03985.x

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Metadata

Authors
HOLDEN, C. W., & SUBRAHMANYAM, A.
Venue
The Journal of Finance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1992-03
Volume
47
Issue
1
Pages
247-270
ISSN
  • 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-6261
OpenAlex
W1975372592
Cited by
801
References
9
FWCI
17.64
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Long‐Lived Private Information and Imperfect Competition. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb03985.x
The paper
HOLDEN, C. W., & SUBRAHMANYAM, A. (1992). Long‐Lived Private Information and Imperfect Competition. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb03985.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.