The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Credit Ratings Game
Open accessAbstract
The collapse of AAA‐rated structured finance products in 2007 to 2008 has brought renewed attention to conflicts of interest in credit rating agencies (CRAs). We model competition among CRAs with three sources of conflicts: (1) CRAs conflict of understating risk to attract business, (2) issuers' ability to purchase only the most favorable ratings, and (3) the trusting nature of some investor clienteles. These conflicts create two distortions. First, competition can reduce efficiency, as it facilitates ratings shopping. Second, ratings are more likely to be inflated during booms and when investors are more trusting. We also discuss efficiency‐enhancing regulatory interventions.
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Cites
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Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice
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How did increased competition affect credit ratings?
Becker, B., & Milbourn, T. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.012 · Cited by 676
Markets: The Credit Rating Agencies
White, L. J. (2010) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.24.2.211 · Cited by 603
Aggregate Confusion: The Divergence of ESG Ratings
Berg, F., Kölbel, J., & Rigobon, R. (2019) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3438533 · Cited by 565
Financial innovation and endogenous growth
Laeven, L., Levine, R., & Michalopoulos, S. (2015) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2014.04.001 · Cited by 534
Metadata
- Authors
- BOLTON, P., FREIXAS, X., & SHAPIRO, J.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2012-01-17
- Volume
- 67
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 85-111
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2893296773
- Cited by
- 940
- References
- 34
- FWCI
- 87.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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