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COEVOLUTION AS AN EVOLUTIONARY GAME
Abstract
Coevolution is modeled as a continuous game where the fitness-maximizing strategy of an individual is assumed to be a function of the strategy of other individuals who are also under selection to maximize fitness. An evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is sought such that no rare alternative strategies can invade the community. The approach can be used to model coevolution because the ESS may be composed of a coalition of more than one strategy. This work, by modeling frequency-dependent selection, extends the approach of Roughgarden (1976) which only considered density-dependent selection. In particular, we show that the coevolutionary model of Rummel and Roughgarden (1985) does contain frequency-dependent selection, and thus, their application of Roughgarden's criterion for evolutionary stability to a model for which it is not applicable leads to the erroneous conclusion that the ecological and evolutionary processes are in conflict. The utility of the game theoretic approach is illustrated by two examples. The first considers an ESS composed of a single strategy, the second an ESS composed of a coalition of two strategies. Evolution occurs on a frequency-dependent adaptive landscape. For this reason, the approach is appropriate for modeling competitive speciation (Rosenzweig, 1978). Also, the game theoretic approach is designed to combine the interplay between the background environment (including the biotic components) and the evolutionary potential of the populations or organisms. The actual application of this theory will require knowledge of both.
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Cites
Simple mathematical models with very complicated dynamics
May, R. M. (1976) · Nature · doi:10.1038/261459a0 · Cited by 7,001
Cited by
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Trait-Based Community Ecology of Phytoplankton
Litchman, E., & Klausmeier, C. A. (2008) · Annual Review of Ecology, Evolution, and Systematics · doi:10.1146/annurev.ecolsys.39.110707.173549 · Cited by 1,290
The dynamical theory of coevolution: a derivation from stochastic ecological processes
Dieckmann, U., & Law, R. (1996) · Journal of Mathematical Biology · doi:10.1007/bf02409751 · Cited by 1,156
Our Current Understanding of Mutualism
Bronstein, J. L. (1994) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/418432 · Cited by 587
Case, T. J., & Taper, M. L. (2000) · The American Naturalist · doi:10.1086/303351 · Cited by 555
Metadata
- Authors
- Brown, J. S., & Vincent, T. L.
- Venue
- Evolution
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1987-01
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 66-79
- ISSN
- 0014-3820 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2016720329
- Cited by
- 172
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 28.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Brown, J. S., & Vincent, T. L. (1987). COEVOLUTION AS AN EVOLUTIONARY GAME. Evolution. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1558-5646.1987.tb05771.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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