When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents?
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The Hatch‐Waxman Act regulates competition between brand‐name and generic drugs in the United States. We examine a feature of the Act that has attracted great controversy but little systematic attention. “Paragraph IV” challenges are a mechanism for generic drug makers to challenge the patents of brand‐name drug makers as a means to secure early market entry. We first present descriptive results that chart the rise of brand‐name patent portfolios and Paragraph IV challenges. Over time, patenting has increased, measured by the number of patents per drug and the length of the nominal patent term. Meanwhile, the fraction of drugs subjected to patent challenges has increased. Drugs are also challenged sooner, relative to brand‐name approval. Our econometric analyses of challenges over the past decade show that brand‐name sales have a positive effect on the likelihood of generic challenge. The likelihood of challenge also varies with the nature of the patent portfolio. A drug with weaker patents faces a significantly higher likelihood of challenge, conditional on sales and other drug characteristics. That is not because the drug's patent protection is weaker overall; additional patents, even weak ones, generally strengthen a brand‐name firm's ability to exclude. Rather, a weak patent, particularly if it expires later than the basic patents, disproportionately attracts a challenge to the pertinent drug. Overall, our results suggest these challenges serve a useful purpose by promoting scrutiny of weaker and late‐expiring patents.
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Citations
Cites
The price of innovation: new estimates of drug development costs
DiMasi, J. A., Hansen, R. W., & Grabowski, H. G. (2003) · Journal of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/s0167-6296(02)00126-1 · Cited by 4,265
Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development
Levin, R. C., Klevorick, A. K., Nelson, R. R., Winter, S. G., Gilbert, R., & Griliches, Z. (1987) · Brookings Papers on Economic Activity · doi:10.2307/2534454 · Cited by 3,772
Cited by
Public R&D Investments and Private-sector Patenting: Evidence from NIH Funding Rules
Azoulay, P., Graff Zivin, J. S., Li, D., & Sampat, B. N. (2019) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdy034 · Cited by 349
“There is likely considerable heterogeneity in the private and social value of drugs (Garthwaite and Duggan, 2012), and individual patents (Hemphill and Sampat, 2011), which our back-of-the-envelope calculations could not fully incorporate.”
Self-citationEvergreening, patent challenges, and effective market life in pharmaceuticals
Hemphill, C. S., & Sampat, B. N. (2012) · Journal of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2012.01.004 · Cited by 262
Self-citationThe Market Impacts of Pharmaceutical Product Patents in Developing Countries: Evidence from India
Duggan, M., Garthwaite, C., & Goyal, A. (2016) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20141301 · Cited by 183
Lou, B., & Wu, L. (2021) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.25300/misq/2021/16565 · Cited by 177
“New drugs are typically patented (Abrams and Sampat 2017; Hemphill and Sampat 2011), because patents are the most effective way to prevent imitations and substitutions (Cohen et al. 2000; Levin et al. 1987).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Hemphill, C. S., & Sampat, B. N.
- Venue
- Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2011-10-28
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 613-649
- ISSN
- 1740-1453 (ISSN-L)
- 1740-1461
- OpenAlex
- W2110872573
- Cited by
- 99
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 14.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Hemphill, C. S., & Sampat, B. N. (2011). When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents? Journal of Empirical Legal Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-1461.2011.01235.x
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