The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Partial cross ownership and tacit collusion
Open accessAbstract
We examine the effects that passive investments in rival firms have on the incentives of firms to engage in tacit collusion. In general, these incentives depend in a complex way on the entire partial cross ownership (PCO) structure in the industry. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions for PCO arrangements to facilitate tacit collusion and also examine how tacit collusion is affected when firms' controllers make direct passive investments in rival firms.
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Cites
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Partial Ownership Arrangements and the Potential for Collusion
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Will Cross-Ownership Re-Establish Market Power in the Nordic Power Market?
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Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership
AZAR, J., SCHMALZ, M. C., & TECU, I. (2018) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12698 · Cited by 980
The Network of Global Corporate Control
Vitali, S., Glattfelder, J. B., & Battiston, S. (2011) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025995 · Cited by 827
Product Market Competition in a World of Cross-Ownership: Evidence from Institutional Blockholdings
He, J. (., & Huang, J. (2017) · The Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhx028 · Cited by 636
Disclosure incentives when competing firms have common ownership
Park, J., Sani, J., Shroff, N., & White, H. (2019) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2019.02.001 · Cited by 305
Overlapping Ownership, R&D Spillovers, and Antitrust Policy
López, Á. L., & Vives, X. (2019) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/701811 · Cited by 303
Metadata
- Authors
- Gilo, D., Moshe, Y., & Spiegel, Y.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2006-03
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 81-99
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- 1756-2171
- OpenAlex
- W3021725422
- Cited by
- 335
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 11.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.