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Cited by 311

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 57 of the 57 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

CEO Involvement in Selecting Board Members, Audit Committee Effectiveness, and Restatements*

Open access
CARCELLO, JOSEPH V., NEAL, TERRY L., PALMROSE, ZOE‐VONNA, SCHOLZ, SUSAN·2011·Contemporary Accounting Research

Abstract

Research finds independent audit committees and audit committee financial experts are generally effective in monitoring the financial reporting and auditing processes. However, not all audit committees that appear in form to be independent are in fact actually independent, and not all financial experts with similar backgrounds and credentials are equally effective. CEO involvement in the board selection process can affect whether an audit committee substantively functions as an independent one. We use financial statement restatements to examine whether the benefits of having an independent and expert audit committee are diminished, or even eliminated, when the CEO is involved in the selection of board members. Our results provide some evidence that the monitoring benefits of having an independent and expert audit committee are only maintained when the CEO is not formally involved in selecting board members, although our proxy for CEO involvement in the director selection process is likely subject to some measurement error. Further, we find that these results appear to be driven by the more severe restatements, including misstatements in conjunction with fraudulent financial reporting. In addition, we find that our results continue to apply in the post-SOX period, a period where we have a more exact measure of CEO involvement in the director selection process. Finally, we find that the stock market’s negative reaction to a restatement is mitigated only when the audit committee is independent and the CEO was not involved in selecting board members.

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Metadata

Authors
CARCELLO, J. V., NEAL, T. L., PALMROSE, Z., & SCHOLZ, S.
Venue
Contemporary Accounting Research
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2011-01-13
Volume
28
Issue
2
Pages
396-430
ISSN
  • 0823-9150 (ISSN-L)
  • 1911-3846
OpenAlex
W3125126350
Cited by
311
References
57
FWCI
70.93
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
bronze

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CARCELLO, J. V., NEAL, T. L., PALMROSE, Z., & SCHOLZ, S. (2011). CEO Involvement in Selecting Board Members, Audit Committee Effectiveness, and Restatements*. Contemporary Accounting Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.2010.01052.x

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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.