The DOI matches its Crossref record; 57 of the 57 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
CEO Involvement in Selecting Board Members, Audit Committee Effectiveness, and Restatements*
Open accessAbstract
Research finds independent audit committees and audit committee financial experts are generally effective in monitoring the financial reporting and auditing processes. However, not all audit committees that appear in form to be independent are in fact actually independent, and not all financial experts with similar backgrounds and credentials are equally effective. CEO involvement in the board selection process can affect whether an audit committee substantively functions as an independent one. We use financial statement restatements to examine whether the benefits of having an independent and expert audit committee are diminished, or even eliminated, when the CEO is involved in the selection of board members. Our results provide some evidence that the monitoring benefits of having an independent and expert audit committee are only maintained when the CEO is not formally involved in selecting board members, although our proxy for CEO involvement in the director selection process is likely subject to some measurement error. Further, we find that these results appear to be driven by the more severe restatements, including misstatements in conjunction with fraudulent financial reporting. In addition, we find that our results continue to apply in the post-SOX period, a period where we have a more exact measure of CEO involvement in the director selection process. Finally, we find that the stock market’s negative reaction to a restatement is mitigated only when the audit committee is independent and the CEO was not involved in selecting board members.
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Cites
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The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management*
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A review of archival auditing research
DeFond, M., & Zhang, J. (2014) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.09.002 · Cited by 3,188
The Effect of Audit Committee Industry Expertise on Monitoring the Financial Reporting Process
Cohen, J. R., Hoitash, U., Krishnamoorthy, G., & Wright, A. M. (2014) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr-50585 · Cited by 430
The Audit Committee: Management Watchdog or Personal Friend of the CEO?
Bruynseels, L., & Cardinaels, E. (2014) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr-50601 · Cited by 408
Eshleman, J. D., & Guo, P. (2014) · AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory · doi:10.2308/ajpt-50792 · Cited by 292
Jahan, N., & Karim, M. S. (2024) · Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory · doi:10.2308/ajpt-2022-129 · Cited by 19
Metadata
- Authors
- CARCELLO, J. V., NEAL, T. L., PALMROSE, Z., & SCHOLZ, S.
- Venue
- Contemporary Accounting Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2011-01-13
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 396-430
- ISSN
- 0823-9150 (ISSN-L)
- 1911-3846
- OpenAlex
- W3125126350
- Cited by
- 311
- References
- 57
- FWCI
- 70.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- CARCELLO, J. V., NEAL, T. L., PALMROSE, Z., & SCHOLZ, S. (2011). CEO Involvement in Selecting Board Members, Audit Committee Effectiveness, and Restatements*. Contemporary Accounting Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.2010.01052.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.