The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification
Abstract
I argue against the orthodox view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. The view under criticism is: if p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of S’s having reason(s) R, and S believes p on the basis of R, then S’s belief that p is doxastically justified. I then propose and evaluate alternative accounts of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, and conclude that we should explain propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification. If correct, this proposal would constitute a significant advance in our understanding of the sources of epistemic justification.
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Citations
Cites
Goldman, A. I. (1979) · Justification and Knowledge · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-9493-5_1 · Cited by 1,468
Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.
Kornblith, H., & Pollock, J. (1988) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2108001 · Cited by 1,152
Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology
Sosa, E. (1991) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625299 · Cited by 1,002
Chisholm, R. M. (1967) · DigitalGeorgetown (Georgetown University Library) · Cited by 864
Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons
Cohen, S. (1999) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.3 · Cited by 737
What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?
Pryor, J. (2004) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00034.x · Cited by 705
Conee, E., & Feldman, R. (2004) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199253722.001.0001 · Cited by 585
Beyond "justification": dimensions of epistemic evaluation
(2005) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.43-0858 · Cited by 485
Feldman, R., & Conee, E. (1985) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/bf00372404 · Cited by 455
Concepts of Epistemic Justification
Alston, W. P. (1985) · The Monist · doi:10.5840/monist198568116 · Cited by 382
Metadata
- Authors
- TURRI, J.
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2010-03
- Volume
- 80
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 312-326
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- 1933-1592
- OpenAlex
- W2131143610
- Cited by
- 446
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 54.69
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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