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THE MULTIPLICITY OF THOUGHT*
Abstract
Many writers have distinguished two types of mental processes. One kind of thinking is conscious, straightforward, predictable, and rather pedestrian; the other is confused, rich, productive of novelty, emotionally charged, and generally outside of consciousness. It is suggested that the latter arises from a multiplicity of processes going on together, while the former represents a single sequence among the crowd. These concepts are clarified by showing that sequence and multiplicity arise as alternative modes of organizing computer programs for pattern recognition. Even in the computer, multiple processing exhibits a superior ability to deal with novel or irregular input, while sequential processing appears less wasteful, and better adapted to fully predictable situations. The properties that have been said to distinguish primary and secondary process, autistic and realistic thinking, creativity and constraint, insightful and rote activity, and the like, are shown to follow from the multiplicity of thought. Relevant experimental findings are discussed.
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Cited by
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Metadata
- Authors
- NEISSER, U.
- Venue
- British Journal of Psychology
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1963-02
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-14
- ISSN
- 0007-1269 (ISSN-L)
- 2044-8295
- OpenAlex
- W2169939080
- Cited by
- 234
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 2.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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