The EU's China Strategies: A Hedging Framework for Analysis

Abstract

By drawing on the concept of hedging, this article develops an analytical framework that conceptualises and explains adjustments in the EU's China strategies since the end of the Cold War. It argues that the EU's China strategy shifted from co‐operative to extensive hedging in the post‐Cold War era and shifted from extensive to conflictive hedging in a new US–China bipolar system. Divided into four parts, the article first notes that despite a contemporary US–China bipolar system, the EU has maintained a general strategy of hedging towards China. The second part of the article defines and conceptualises hedging and provides a hedging framework for analysis based on three different types of hedging strategies. The third part explains the shift in the EU's China strategy from co‐operative to extensive hedging in the post‐Cold War era. The fourth part contends that the EU has adjusted from extensive to conflictive hedging in a new US–China bipolar system. The conclusion notes that the Soviet Union posed an overwhelming threat to Western Europe during the previous bipolar system, which compelled the European Economic Community towards containment and balancing. China represents much more of a risk than a threat to the EU in the new bipolar system, which allows the EU to sustain a hedging strategy and prioritise de‐risking.