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Do Jurors Give Appropriate Weight to Forensic Identification Evidence?

Thompson, William C., Kaasa, Suzanne O., Peterson, Tiamoyo · 2013 · Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
Cited by 37

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Do jurors give appropriate weight to forensic identification evidence? When judging the value of forensic evidence, are they sensitive to the probability of a false match? To answer these questions, we conducted two jury simulation experiments—the first with undergraduate participants, the second with members of a county jury pool. The experiments examined the weight that participants gave to forensic DNA evidence relative to Bayesian norms when evaluating a hypothetical criminal case. We found that aggregate judgments were generally consistent with B ayesian expectations, although people overvalued the DNA evidence when the probability of a false report of a match was high relative to the random match probability. Judgments of the chances the defendant was guilty varied appropriately in response to the variation in the probability of a false report of a match, as did verdicts. Our findings refute claims that jurors are always conservative B ayesians when evaluating forensic evidence and suggest, instead, that they use a variety of judgmental strategies and sometimes engage in fallacious statistical reasoning. In light of these findings, we identify circumstances in which forensic evidence may be overutilized, discuss implications for legal policy, and suggest additional lines of research.

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Crossref · 10.1111/jels.12013

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Metadata

Authors
Thompson, W. C., Kaasa, S. O., & Peterson, T.
Venue
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2013-04-18
Volume
10
Issue
2
Pages
359-397
ISSN
  • 1740-1453 (ISSN-L)
  • 1740-1461
OpenAlex
W1872112685
Cited by
37
References
4
FWCI
27.95
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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